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INTRODUCTION
Despite pockets of urban renewal and the determined efforts of its
loyal citizens, the city of Detroit is a ‘‘shadow of the thriving
metropolis that it once was,’’ beset by ‘‘decades of fiscal
mismanagement, plummeting population, employment and revenues,
decaying City infrastructure, deteriorating City services and excessive
borrowing that provided short term band-aids at the cost of
deepening insolvency.’’1 Detroit has more than 140,000 blighted
properties, and approximately 78,000 ‘‘abandoned and blighted’’
structures, some 38,000 of which are considered dangerous.2 In 2012,
the City’s violent crime rate was five times the national average, and
higher than any U.S. city with a population greater than 200,000.3
1. See, e.g., Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of the City of Detroit,
Michigan’s Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code at 4---5, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Orr Declaration]; see also Opinion Regarding
Eligibility at 20---22, In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2013).
2. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 25, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 1353846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter
Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications]; Nick Carey, Detroit Blight

Battle to Take Down Abandoned Buildings Could Be Key to Bankrupt City’s
Survival, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/07/25/detroit-blight-abandoned-buildings-bankrupt-_n_3651224.html. The
number of abandoned and blighted structures represents approximately one-fifth of
the City’s housing stock. See id.
3. See e.g., Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 12; see also CITY OF
DETROIT OFFICE OF THE EMERGENCY MANAGER, CITY OF DETROIT: PROPOSAL FOR
CREDITORS 9 (2013) [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS], available at
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The homicide rate alone is at the highest level in nearly forty years.4
Citizens wait almost one hour for police to respond to calls, when the
national average is only eleven minutes,5 and the City’s case clearance
rate for violent crimes is ‘‘substantially below’’ that of comparable
municipalities.6
Once a thriving industrial center, Detroit’s economy is in shambles.
The number of jobs in Detroit has declined precipitously over the
years,7 and the City’s unemployment rate stood at 18.3% as of June
2012, having nearly tripled since 2000.8 Those Detroiters fortunate
enough to be employed are likely to earn far less than other residents
of Michigan, and the percentage of Detroiters living below the
poverty line is far greater than in Michigan as whole.9 As economic
conditions have declined, the City’s population has plummeted,
falling sixty-three percent since the City’s post-War peak and twentysix percent since just 2000.10 Economic decline and population loss
have eroded the City’s tax base, causing tax revenues to plummet11
even as residents’ per capita tax burden has ballooned.12 The City is
so cash-strapped that public services for residents and business are

http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Pro
posal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, at 12, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Statement of Qualifications].
5. Id. at 12; Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 22; Opinion Regarding Eligibility,
supra note 1, at 12.
6. Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 23.
7. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 20 (‘‘The number of jobs in Detroit (for
residents and non-residents) declined from 735,104 in 1970, to 562,120 in 1980, to
412,490 in 1990, to 346,545 in 2012.’’) (citations omitted).
8. PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 1; Orr Declaration, supra note 1,
at 20 (citing SOUTHEAST MICH. CONFERENCE OF GOV’TS, POPULATION AND
HOUSEHOLD ESTIMATES FOR SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN (2012), available at
http://www.semcog.org/uploadedFiles/Population_and_Household_Estimates_for_D
ecember_2012.pdf).
9. See, e.g., Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 17 (‘‘Detroiters’ average per capita
annual income from 2007 to 2011 was $15,261; the median household income for that
same period was $27,862.43 During that period, an estimated 36% of Detroiters were
living below the poverty line. Only 54% of Detroiters owned a home, the median
value of which was $71,100. To put these numbers in perspective, the average per
capita annual income in Michigan from 2007 to 2011 was $25,482,46 the median
household income was $48,66947 and only 16% of Michigan citizens lived below the
poverty line. The state-wide homeownership rate was 74%, and the median home
value was $137,300.49.’’) (citations omitted).
10. See, e.g., PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 1; Orr Declaration,
supra note 1, at 13---14.
11. See, e.g., Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 16, 18.
12. See, e.g., id. at 16, 20.
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now severely inadequate.13 Forty percent of the city’s street lights do
not work.14 There are reports of abandoned dogs roaming some of
the City’s streets.15 Photographs of parts of Detroit remind one of
New Orleans, post-Katrina------except that in Detroit, the waters of
decay and decline have been seeping into the city for the past fifty
years.
On July 18, 2013, in the face of these challenges, Detroit’s
Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr filed a petition on behalf of the City
seeking bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code.16 (As required by Michigan law, Orr filed the
petition on Detroit’s behalf after having sought and received
authorization from Michigan Governor Richard Snyder.17) The City’s
filings paint a grim picture of Detroit’s fiscal condition. Detroit has
more than 100,000 creditors and it owes those creditors more than $18

13. See, e.g., id. at 21---22. On March 15, 2013, attorney Kevyn D. Orr was
appointed emergency manager of Detroit by the Local Emergency Financial
Assistance Loan Board (LEFALB) created under Sections 141.931---141.942 of the
Emergency Municipal Loan Act, pursuant to Public Act 72 of 1990 of the State of
Michigan, also known as Sections 141.1201---141.1291 of the Local Government Fiscal
Responsibility Act. Id.
14. See, e.g., id. at 24.
15. See Mark Binelli, City of Strays: Detroit’s Epidemic of 50,000 Abandoned
Dogs, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/
city-of-strays-detroits-epidemic-of-50-000-wild-dogs-20120320;
Corey
Williams,
Detroit Stray Dogs Counted in First Survey of City’s Abandoned Pet Population,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2013, 1:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/
22/detroit-stray-dogs-survey-count_n_3972292.html#slide=more318123.
16. See Bankruptcy Petition, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013). Orr was appointed Emergency Manager
in March 2013 after Michigan’s Governor found that a financial emergency existed in
the City. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 24---31 (for a discussion
of the events leading the appointment of Orr as Emergency Manager); see also Orr
Declaration, supra note 1, at 1---3. As Emergency Manager, Orr acts in the place and
stead of the City’s elected mayor. Id.
17. Statement of Qualifications, supra note 4, at 7---9, 11---14; see also Letter from
Kevin D. Orr, Emergency Manager, City of Detroit, Mich., to Richard Snyder,
Governor, State of Mich. & Andrew Dillon, Treasurer, State of Mich. 11 (July 16,
2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit J) (‘‘The City must be
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor
under chapter 9 by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization
empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under chapter 9. PA
436 authorizes the commencement of a chapter 9 case by the Emergency Manager
upon the Governor’s authorization.’’).
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billion.18 The City’s debts, which are comprised of $11.9 billion in
unsecured debt and $6.4 billion in secured debt,19 include:
approximately (a) $5.85 billion in special revenue obligations; (b)
$6.4 billion in other post-employment benefits, or ‘‘OPEB’’
liabilities; (c) $3.5 billion in underfunded pension liabilities based on
current actuarial estimates; (d) $1.13 billion in secured and
unsecured general obligation (‘‘GO’’) liabilities; (e) $1.43 billion in
liabilities under pension-related certificates of participation
(‘‘COPs’’); (f) $295.5 million in swap liabilities related to the COPs
and (g) $300 million in other liabilities.20

The City’s filings state that ‘‘debt service on obligations other than
those secured by special revenues consumed a staggering 42.5% of
the City’s revenues in the 2013 fiscal year,’’ a percentage the city
estimates will increase to 65% of revenues by 2017.21
Detroit’s bankruptcy petition------which the City’s public workers
bitterly oppose22------raises two issues of first impression with
implications for bankruptcy law, state and federal Constitutional law
and municipal securities regulation: First, can Detroit use Chapter 9
to reduce or restructure accrued pension rights of retired city workers
when the Michigan Constitution contains (i) a clause stating that
‘‘[t]he accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement
system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby’’
(the Pension Clause),23 and (ii) a clause stating that ‘‘[n]o . . . law
impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted’’ (the Contracts

18. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 44;
see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 5.
19. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 5. Detroit is the largest
municipal bankruptcy case filed in U.S. history. See, e.g., Michael Fletcher, Detroit
Goes Bankrupt, Largest Municipal Filing in U.S. History, WASH. POST, July 18, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/detroit-files-largest-municipalbankruptcy-in-us-history/2013/07/18/a8db3f0e-efe6-11e2-bed3-b9b6fe264871_
story.html
20. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 2---3;
see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7.
21. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 3.
22. See, e.g., Objection of the Detroit Retirement Systems to the Motion of
Debtor for Entry of an Order (I) Authorizing the Assumption of that Certain
Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement Pursuant to section 365(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, (II) Approving such Agreement Pursuant to Rule 9019 and (III)
Granting Related Relief, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2013); Consolidated Objection of the Retiree
Association Parties to Eligibility, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2013).
23. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
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Clause)?24 Second, will debts associated with unlimited tax general
obligation bonds (UTGO)------or, bonds backed by the full faith and
credit or taxing power of the issuer------be subject to adjustment in
bankruptcy, when (i) Detroit already is levying taxes at or near
statutory maximums; (ii) citizens cannot, as a practical matter, absorb
tax increases due to poverty, economic decline and population loss;
and (iii) Detroit does not have (and will not have, without
restructuring) sufficient funds to pay in full both accrued pension
benefits and general obligation bond debt?
On December 5, 2013, after extensive briefing and lengthy
hearings, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan (Judge Steven Rhodes) issued a landmark 143-page
opinion regarding Detroit’s eligibility (Opinion Regarding
Eligibility).25 Citing the Pension Clause, public workers had argued
that Detroit is not eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor because the City
failed to carve out accrued pension benefits and protect them from
adjustment.26 After cataloging Detroit’s dire financial circumstances
and the grim realities of life in Detroit, Judge Rhodes held that
Detroit is eligible to be a debtor despite the failure explicitly to
protect accrued pension benefits.27 Judge Rhodes further held that
accrued pension benefits can be adjusted in Chapter 9 proceedings,
notwithstanding the Pension Clause. Judge Rhodes reasoned that
accrued pension benefits are contract rights under Michigan law,28
and that they can be impaired in bankruptcy along with other
contracts, without running afoul of United States or Michigan
Constitutions.29 While Judge Rhodes was careful to emphasize that
the court ‘‘will not lightly or casually exercise the power under federal
bankruptcy law to impair pensions,’’30 the opinion (if it stands)31

24. Id. art. I, § 10.
25. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1.
26. Id. at 29. These objections, and others, are discussed below.
27. Id. at 5---6, 38---142.
28. Id. at 41---44.
29. Id. Judge Rhodes held that ‘‘[t]he [Michigan] state constitutional provisions
prohibiting the impairment of contracts and pensions impose no constraint on the
bankruptcy process.’’ Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 44.
31. Following Judge Rhodes’ ruling respecting eligibility, a number of Objectors
filed timely appeals, and later moved to certify Judge Rhodes’s opinion regarding the
City’s eligibility for direct appeal to the Sixth Circuit on an expedited basis. See, e.g.,
Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, and Detroit Police
Command Officers Ass’n, Amended Motion to Certify the Court’s Eligibility Ruling
for Direct Appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, In re City of Detroit, Mich.,
No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2013); Request of
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means that that the accrued pension benefits of Detroit’s public
workers may be subject to impairment in the City’s bankruptcy case.32
Detroit’s debt crisis and Judge Rhodes’ ruling bring conflicts
between municipal stakeholders into sharp relief. First, there are
Detroit’s residents. Although they are responsible for paying the
City’s debts through taxes and fees, they (i) face an enormous tax
burden, already levied at or near statutory maximums, (ii) have
limited resources to meet this burden due to population loss,
economic decline and unemployment, and (iii) face escalating
expenses, crumbling infrastructure and grossly inadequate services,
despite their tax burden. Next, there are public workers, especially
retired workers with accrued pensions and other post-employment
benefits. These workers are not wealthy (pensioners reportedly
receive an average of $18,000 per year),33 and they were promised
benefits------promises supported by the Pension Clause------but the City’s
overwhelming debt load makes it difficult to see how these and other
obligations can be met. Finally, there are the city’s creditors/lenders,
including general obligation bondholders, some of whom were
promised that the city’s taxing power and/or dedicated revenue
streams would be available for repayment, but who now are being
told that they should expect substantial losses. Put simply, Detroit is
faced with a toxic stew of competing rights and obligations, and it
cannot simply tax, cut or borrow its way out of economic distress.
The following Article, examines legal questions presented by
Detroit’s bankruptcy against the backdrop of this toxic stew. Part I
examines the municipality as debtor, and discusses how and why
municipalities incur debts, and why struggling municipalities like
Detroit find it difficult to make ends meet. Part II examines the legal
questions referenced above and discusses Judge Rhodes’ opinion.
Part III examines potential reforms, and argues that state and local
governments ought to develop and implement robust systems to (i)

International Union, UAW and Flowers Plaintiffs for Certification Permitting
Immediate & Direct Appeal to the Sixth Circuit from the Court’s Eligibility
Determinations, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013). On December 20, 2013, Judge Rhodes issued a
memorandum in which he certified that the Objectors’ appeals involve a ‘‘matter of
public importance’’ under subsection (i) of § 158(d)(2)(A)(i), but recommended that
authorization for immediate, direct appeal to the Sixth Circuit be denied.
Memorandum Regarding: I. Certification Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) II.
Recommendation on Whether Direct Appeals Should Be Authorized & III. Parties’
Request to Recommend Expedited Consideration of Appeals at 9, In re City of
Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2013).
32. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 80.
33. Id. at 6.
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identify struggling municipalities earlier, (ii) intervene earlier with
oversight controls, technical assistance (including assistance with
governance, financial decision-making and internal controls) and
potentially financial assistance; and (iii) develop robust work-out
mechanisms before a crisis erupts. In making these proposals, this
Article acknowledges that these reforms require political will, which
inevitably is in short supply. Consequently, I argue that requiring
fidelity to the public good------via a fiduciary standard for public
officials and other stakeholders (including the financial institutions
that serve as underwriters and derivatives counterparties in municipal
securities offerings and related transactions)------could help to ensure
that those in a position to obligate the municipality make decisions
that are in the municipality’s best interest, over the long term.
I. THE MUNICIPALITY AS DEBTOR: WHY DO CITIES INCUR
DEBT, AND WHY DO THEY STRUGGLE TO MAKE ENDS MEET?
To put Detroit’s fiscal crisis in context, it helps to understand why
cities incur debt, and why legal, economic and political forces can
make it difficult for distressed cities to make ends meet. The next
section addresses this foundational question, focusing on
municipalities’ obligation to provide infrastructure and services to
residents despite legal, economic and political constraints on both
revenue and debt relief.
A. Funding Imperative: Public Purpose
State and local governments face a fundamental fiscal challenge:
they must spend on infrastructure and public services, but there are
constraints on revenues available for this work, and few opportunities
for expense reduction or debt relief.34 Unlike businesses, which may
scale back operations or reduce head-count when times are tough,
municipalities cannot close up shop. Instead, they must provide at
least basic infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, water and sewer plants),
education (e.g., schools, teachers), and health and safety services (e.g.,
34. See, e.g., Shaheen Borna & Krishna G. Mantripragada, Morality of Public
Deficits: A Historical Perspective, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 1989, at 33, 35
(‘‘The goal of public finance . . . is, ideally, to bring about maximum social
welfare . . . .’’). As I have argued elsewhere, this funding imperative means that
municipalities may have less flexibility than their corporate counterparts respecting
the timing and amount of borrowing and expenditures, and less flexibility to reduce
expenses through deferral, head-count reduction or the sale or leveraging of assets.
See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local

Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rages, and Opportunities
for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1481---84 (2013).
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fire, police, EMS) for residents at all times. For example, compare
Detroit’s non-waivable obligation to provide basic infrastructure and
services (including fire, police, EMS and a public education for its
children) with smartphone maker Blackberry, Ltd.’s freedom to lay
off 4500 workers and scale back operations in response to
deteriorating sales and revenue numbers. 35 Similarly, compare
Detroit’s obligation to ‘‘stay in business’’ despite its insolvency with
auto manufacturers’ ability to shutter plants, lay off workers and
declare bankruptcy in response to fiscal stress.36
In fact, government’s obligation to remain open for business drives
spending. According to the United States Census Bureau’s 2011
summary of state and local government spending, for example,
education and utility expenditures ‘‘topped their [local government]
spending at $599.3 billion and $183.7 billion, respectively.’’37 Public
safety spending (police and fire in particular) also weighed heavily on
local governments, according to the Census Bureau,38 as did spending
on water and gas supply.39 This obligation to spend, even in the face
of economic stress, can lead to tensions between stakeholders with
competing claims on limited government resources.

35. See, e.g., Hugo Miller, Blackberry to Fire 4,500, Write Down Up to $960
Million, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0920/blackberry-to-fire-4-500-write-down-up-to-960-million.html.
36. See, e.g., MARIAN KRYZOWSKI & LAWRENCE A. MOLNAR, Univ. of Mich.

Office of the Vice President for Research, Institute for Research on Labor,
Employment and the Economy, Impacts of the Automotive Industry’s Restructuring,
FED. RESERVE BANK CHI., http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/
2009/automotive_communities/presentation_impact_of_restructuring.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2014) (referencing a case study by the University of Michigan’s Institute for
Labor, Employment and the Economy which found that the closure of a single plant
(the General Motors’ Moraine Assembly Plant in Montgomery County, Ohio) led to
the loss of thousands of jobs, and had a total economic impact to the regional
economy in excess of $700,000); Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for
GM’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/business/
02auto.html?_r=0 (discussing General Motors’ 2009 bankruptcy filing).
37. JEFFREY L. BARNETT & PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES SUMMARY: 2011 4 (2013), available at
http://www2.census.gov/govs/local/summary_report.pdf.
38. Cf. id. (‘‘Public safety spending (comprised of police, fire, and corrections)
was dominated by local governments, with the exception of spending on corrections.
Local governments comprised 86.7 percent of the state and local government total
spending on police protection. Spending on fire protection was an entirely local
government function. State government spending comprised 63.9 percent of state and
local government spending on correction.’’).
39. Id. (‘‘Utility spending was also dominated by local governments, with
spending on water supply and gas supply almost entirely conducted by local governments, at 99.4 percent and 99.8 percent, respectively.’’).
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The Challenge of Meeting Basic Infrastructure and Public
Service Needs in the Face of Fiscal Constraints.

Detroit’s obligation------and current inability------to meet public safety
needs ‘‘bring[s] the depth of [the City’s] service delivery insolvency
into stark relief,’’40 and demonstrates how a city’s obligation to spend,
even in the face of fiscal hardship, can accelerate financial collapse
and pit stakeholders against one another.
As noted in the
Introduction, Detroit’s public safety needs are enormous and unmet,
and the City’s large geographic footprint, depopulation and
expanding blight continue to worsen the situation.41 Today, the City’s
over-burdened police and fire resources are disproportionately
diverted to distressed areas in far-flung regions of the of the City
which are ‘‘littered with abandoned, forfeited or foreclosed land and
structures,’’ and which have become a ‘‘breeding ground’’ for crime.42
Of the 11,000 to 12,000 fires that the City experienced each year for
the past ten years, approximately sixty percent have occurred in
blighted and unoccupied buildings, forcing police and fire
departments to expend precious resources fighting blazes in vacant,
dangerous structures.43 Even getting to these locations is difficult: the
City’s infrastructure for police, fire and EMS is so ‘‘aged,
inadequately maintained and lack[ing in] modern technology’’ that it
has ‘‘been reduced to accepting charitable donations to inspect its
ground and truck ladders and to upgrade its fleet (donations which do
not begin to resolve the issues plaguing the City’s vehicle fleet).’’44
The cost of making a material dent in urban blight, and thus
(hopefully) reducing the burden on fire and public safety services,
could ‘‘easily exceed half a billion dollars’’ according to the City45-----resources the City clearly does not have.46 Moreover, even if the City

40. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at
23.
41. For a series of maps which reflect the City’s population decline, and the
challenge of address public health and safety given Detroit’s geographically large
footprint, see Robert Linn, The High Cost of Free Walking, MAPPING STRAIT (Dec.
8,
2011,
3:19
AM),
http://mapdetroit.blogspot.com/2011/high-cost-of-freewalking.html; The Shrinking of Detroit, MAP SCROLL (June 13, 2009, 5:29 PM),
http://mapscroll.blogspot.com/2009/06/shrinking-of-detroit.html.
42. See Memorandum In Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2,
24---25 (citing Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 5).
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id. at 25.
46. See, e.g., Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 37---41.
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could reduce blight, it still would not be able to make the kind of
public safety investments needed to put the City back on track.
B.

1.

Legacy Liabilities: A Driver of Indebtedness

Pensions and OPEB: A Gordian Knot for Municipal Officials

If the City’s public safety needs are obvious, however, finding the
resources to address these needs has become a Gordian knot. In part,
this difficulty is because paying for public safety involves costs
associated with current work force (fire, police, EMS) as well as
legacy expenses associated with retired workers who worked (and
were promised benefits) during earlier, less cash-strapped times.47 As
noted above, Detroit’s legacy pension and OPEB obligations are
enormous, representing more than half of the City’s outstanding debt,
and the City’s poverty and economic decline make it difficult to see
how it can ever satisfy its legacy expense-related debts.48
To understand why legacy obligations are so large and challenging
for Detroit, it helps to remember that Detroit’s pension plans have
design challenges and funding obligations not shared by most private
employers.49 For example, public pension plans must address the lack
of social security participation and coverage for certain workers, and
in some cases, earlier mandatory retirement ages.50 Detroit’s Police
and Fire Retirement System (PFRS) administers the pension plan for
the City’s uniformed personnel,51 and these retirees generally are not
eligible for Social Security retirement benefits or disability benefits.52
The legal and accounting regimes applicable to public and private
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 3---8 (citing City’s report of
$5.7 billion in OPEB liabilities as of June 2011 (the most recent actuarial data
available), $3.5 billion in underfunded pension liabilities based on current actuarial
estimates), $1.43 billion in liabilities under pension-related certificates of obligation
(COP); and $346.6 million in swap liabilities related to the COPs and noting burden
these amounts impose on City’s finances).
49. See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public
Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263, 263---71 (2011).
50. Id.; see also PUB. PLANS PRACTICES TASK FORCE OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
ACTUARIES, RISK MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC PLAN RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2010),
available at http://actuary.org/pdf/pension/PPPTF_Final_Report_c.pdf (‘‘State and
local workers were excluded from Social Security, at its inception, and thus,
subsequently, many states and local governments endeavored to establish plans.’’).
51. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 6.
52. Id. (citing Objection of the Detroit Retirement Systems to the Eligibility of
the City of Detroit, Michigan, to be a Debtor Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code at 5, In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013)).
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pension plans also are different, and rules for public sector plans vary
from state to state.53 In Detroit’s case, for example, the Pension

53. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 263---71. For example, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), does not apply to governmental
plans. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 4(b), 29
U.S.C. § 1003 (2012); ERISA § 3(32). There also are differences in the budgeting
process and accounting standards applicable to public pensions which can make it
difficult for workers and citizens to understand the nature, scope, and extent of
liabilities associated with pension and OPEB obligations. See Secunda, supra note 49,
at 263---71. The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) establishes
generally accepted accounting principles that are used by many state and local
governments. See Mission, Vision, and Core Values, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=
1175804850352 (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (stating the mission of MSRB is ‘‘[t]o
establish and improve standards of state and local governmental accounting and
financial reporting that will: [r]esult in useful information for users of financial
reports, and [g]uide and educate the public, including issuers, auditors, and users of
those financial reports’’). Unlike Generally Accepted Accounting Standards for
Commission registrants, however, compliance with GASB standards is not
mandatory in all jurisdictions. For example, the Texas legislature enacted a law that
requires the State, and permits local governments, not to use GASB statement 45,
which requires the governmental entities that provide health care, life insurance and
other post-employment benefits to retirees to report the estimated accrued cost of
the benefits. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2266.051, 2266.052, 2266.102 (West
2008); see also Summary of Statement No. 45: Accounting and Financial Reporting
by Employees for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions, GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (June 2004), http://www.gasb.org/st/summary/
gstsm45.html. So, while there are a number of GASB pronouncements concerning
pension-related obligations (see list below), individual issuers may or may not comply
with them when reporting on financial obligations in this area. See, e.g., STATEMENT
NO. 25: FINANCIAL REPORTING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE
DISCLOSURES FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. (1994), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=
GASB&c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocument
Page&cid=1176160029908 (follow ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink) (establishing financial
reporting standards for public defined benefit pension plans) (Note: GASB approved
an exposure draft on June 27, 2011 which would amend GASB Statement No. 25);
STATEMENT NO. 27, ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS BY STATEMENT AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (1994),
available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=GASB&c=Document_C&
pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176160029312
(follow ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink) (establishing standards for pension information in the
financial reports of state and local government employers) (Note: GASB approved
an Exposure Draft on June 27, 2011 which would amend GASB Statement No. 27);
STATEMENT NO. 50, PENSION DISCLOSURES, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. (2007), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=
Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=
1176159988758 (follow the ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink) (amending GASB Statement Nos. 25
and 27); STATEMENT NO. 67, FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSION PLANS------AN
AMENDMENT OF GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. (2012), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=
Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=
1176160220594 (follow the ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink); STATEMENT NO. 68, ACCOUNTING
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Benefit Guarantee Corporation does not insure pension benefits
under either PFRS or the City’s General Retirement System (GRS),
which administers the pension plan for the City’s non-uniformed
personnel.54 In addition, as discussed below, the Michigan Pension
Clause prevents the City and the State from impairing accrued
pension benefits in ways that might be available to private employers
under the federal employee benefits regime.55
Perhaps most importantly, Detroit’s defined benefit pension plans
have funding and benefit obligations not shared by most private
sector employers.56 In contrast to the private sector, where defined
contribution plans are the norm, public sector employers like Detroit
are much more likely to offer defined benefit plans.57 With defined
contribution plans, workers contribute to their own retirement
through retirement savings accounts (e.g., a 401k).58 Workers bear
the risk of underfunding with defined contribution plans, because if a
worker fails to contribute, contributes an insufficient amount, or if
investment choices do not perform as well as the worker had hoped,
the worker’s retirement account value may suffer,59 but the employer

AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSIONS-----AN AMENDMENT OF GASB STATEMENT
NO. 27, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (2012), available at

http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename=GASB/Docume
nt_C/GASBDocumentPage&cid=1176160220621 (follow ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink);.
54. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 6.
55. See id. at 42 (citing MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 24; Kosa v. Treasurer of State of
Mich., 292 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Mich. 1980) (finding that State and City cannot
unilaterally impair pensions under Michigan Pension Clause, and noting that clause
resulted from an effort by teachers to ‘‘lobb[y] for a constitutional amendment
granting contractual status to retirement benefits.’’)); see also In re Constitutionality
of 2011 PA 38, 806 N.W.2d 683, 693 (Mich. 2011) (‘‘The obvious intent of § 24,
however, was to ensure that public pensions be treated as contractual obligations
that, once earned, could not be diminished.’’); see generally Secunda, supra note 49.
56. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 267---74.
57. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES MARCH 2013,
at 177, 366 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2013/ebbl0052.pdf.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics March 2013 National Compensation
Survey, eighty-nine percent of state and local government workers have access to
retirement plans. Id. at 366 tbl. 2. Eighty-three percent of those with access have
access to a defined benefit plan, while only thirty two percent have access to a
defined contribution plan. Id. By comparison, the survey revealed that only sixtyfour percent of private sector workers have access to a retirement plan, and of those
with access, only nineteen percent have access to a defined benefit plan compared to
fifty-none percent with access to a defined contribution plan. Id. at 177.
58. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 269---72.
59. See id.
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has no direct obligation to help or otherwise ‘‘make up’’ for losses.60
With defined benefit plans, however, employees are promised a
specific monthly benefit based upon a formula.61 To fund promised
benefits, employers and employees make contributions into an
investment pool.62 The employer makes investment decisions on
behalf of the pool, assumes market risk, and must make up the
difference if pool is insufficient to pay promised benefits.63
The public employer’s obligation to ‘‘make up the difference’’ if
plan assets fall short gives rise to the risk and problem of
underfunding. Underfunding occurs when a defined benefit plan
sponsor fails to make contributions (or sufficient contributions) to
fund accrued actuarial liabilities. In Detroit’s case, the pension
systems for public workers have a substantial underfunding problem.64
At the end of the City’s 2012 fiscal year, Detroit’s two retirement
systems (the GRS and PFRS) together had over 20,000 employees
receiving benefits, an additional 2400 former employees who were
entitled to but who were not yet receiving benefits, and more than
9,700 active employees who had an expectation of receiving benefits

60. See id. at 269---272 (‘‘Of course . . . a larger percentage of these private-sector
pension plans are now defined contribution plans, meaning that employers are
generally not responsible for having sufficient funds on hand when employees retire.
These employers simply make a one-time contribution (or none at all if the employer
is dealing with a Section 401(k) deferral plan without a matching contribution) and
there are no subsequent pension funding responsibilities. Simply put, employees in
the defined benefit context are left with the responsibility of planning so that they
have enough in their pension fund account when they retire.’’) (internal citations
omitted).
61. See id. at 268---69.
62. See id. at 268---69; 2011 Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State and Local
Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, www.census.gov/govs/retire (last visited Feb. 11, 2014)
(spreadsheet entitled ‘‘Revenues By State and Local Government’’). According to
the United States Census Bureau’s 2011 Annual Survey of Public Pensions, in 2011,
employees contributed $40,298,909 to defined benefit plans whereas employers (state
and local) contributed a total of $96,184,812. See id. (spreadsheet entitled ‘‘Revenues
By State and Local Government’’). For best practices respecting funding defined
benefit plans, see Best Practice: Guidelines for Funding Defined Benefit Pensions
(2013) (CORBA), GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.gfoa.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=2598 (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) and Best

Practice: Reviewing, Understanding and Using the Actuarial Valuation Report and
Its Role in Plan Funding (CORBA) (2013), GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, http://
www.gfoa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2756 (last visited Feb.
11, 2014).
63. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 268---69.
64. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 6. There has been
considerable debate in the bankruptcy court respecting the degree of underfunding.
See e.g., id.

786

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

when they retire, according to the City’s bankruptcy filings.65 Using
current valuation assumptions and methods, as of June 30, 2011, the
GRS and PFRS had unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities of
approximately $639.9 million, according to the City’s calculations.66
According to the City’s bankruptcy papers, the actual amount of
these liabilities is likely far higher, as current assumptions and
valuation methodologies ‘‘serve to substantially understate the
Systems’ unfunded liabilities.’’67
These legacy liabilities are a
substantial drain on Detroit’s resources: Judge Rhodes found that
38.6% of the City’s revenue was consumed by servicing legacy
liabilities in 2012,68 and that ‘‘forecasts for subsequent years, assuming
no restructuring, are 42.5% for 2013, 54.3% for 2014, 59.5% for 2015,
63% for 2016, and 64.5% for 2017.69
Detroit’s situation is not unique. According to the Pew Center on
the States, as early as 2008, there was a $1 trillion gap between the
$2.35 trillion that states and participating localities had set aside to
pay pensions,70 health care, and OPEB71 promised to public sector
employees, and the $3.35 trillion in estimated actual cost.72 More
recently, the Pew Center found that ‘‘thirty cities at the center of the
nation’s most populous metropolitan areas faced more than $192
billion in unpaid commitments for pensions and other retiree benefits,
primarily health care, as of fiscal 2009,’’ including ‘‘a long-term

65. See Declaration of Charles M. Moore In Support of the City of Detroit,
Michigan’s Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code, at 4---5, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013).
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id.
68. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7.
69. See id. at 7; see also Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications,
supra note 2, at 3.
70. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘‘[n]early 20
million employees and over 7 million retirees and survivors are covered by state and
local government pension plans.’’ U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES HAVE
EVOLVED GRADUALLY AS PLANS TAKE ON INCREASED RISK 1 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308867.pdf.
71. Pension and OPEB liabilities have been the subject of significant debate and
analysis in recent years. See, D. Roderick Kiewiet, The Day After Tomorrow: The
Politics of Public Employee Retirement Benefits, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y, Sept. 2010.
72. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNFUNDED STATE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS TO REFORM 1 (2010), available at
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/Trillion_Dollar_Gap_Und
erfunded_State_Retirement_Systems_and_the_Roads_to_Reform.pdf.
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shortfall of $88 billion for pensions and $104 billion for retiree health
care and other non-pension benefits.’’73
Anecdotally, in addition to Detroit, other municipalities across the
United States have identified public workers’ salary, pension benefits
and OPEB as contributing to fiscal distress. For example, San
Bernadino, California sought Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection in
2012 after declining home prices, falling tax revenues and increasing
expenses rendered the city insolvent.74 In finding the city to be an
eligible debtor, the bankruptcy court commented that that ‘‘[c]ity
employee salaries and benefits, as in most municipalities, make up
75% of the City’s budget and, as the need for services grew in the
[pre-recession] boom, so did the number of City employees and
consequent expenses.’’75 ‘‘Adding to these costs’’ according to the
judge ‘‘were the particularly lucrative retirement benefits which the
Common Council had negotiated in the collective bargaining
agreements with the City’s seven unions.’’76
Public employee
contracts, pension and/or OPEB also have been identified as drivers
of distress in Central Falls, Rhode Island (filed for bankruptcy in
2011),77 and Stockton, California (filed for bankruptcy in 2012).78
As the Pew Center has observed, and as the situation in Detroit
reflects, unfunded pension and retiree health care plans pose
significant challenges for city budgets, citizens and public workers.79
For public workers and retirees, underfunding (and the potential for
associated loss or diminution of benefits, or impaired stability of the
plan) can have a devastating impact on personal financial condition
because, in the absence of social security, there is no safety net. For
cities, underfunding ‘‘limit[s] policymakers’ ability to invest in other
priorities because ‘‘[e]very dollar that goes to plug a hole in the city’s

73. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, CITIES SQUEEZED BY PENSION AND RETIREE
HEALTH CARE SHORTFALL 1 (2013), available at http://www.pewstates.org/
uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2013/Pew_city_pensions_brief.pdf.
74. Voluntary Petition, City of San Bernadino, Cal., No. RS 6:12-bk-28006 MJ
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012); City of San Bernardino Eligibility Opinion at 778--80, In re City of San Bernadino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (No. RS
6:12-bk-28006 MJ).
75. City of San Bernadino Eligibility Opinion, supra note 74, at 779.
76. Id.
77. Scott Malone, Rhode Island’s Central Falls Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS,
Aug. 1, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-rhodeislandcentralfalls-idUSTRE7703ID20110801.
78. See, e.g., Jim Christie, Stockton Bankruptcy The Result of 15-year Spending
Binge, REUTERS, July 4, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/04/
stockton-bankruptcy_n_1648634.html.
79. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 73, at 1---2.
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retirement funds is a dollar that cannot be spent’’ on infrastructure
and services.80 In practical terms, this means that fewer dollars are
available for public safety, education and infrastructure, as
municipalities are forced to allocate resources to pension and OPEBrelated obligations. And for taxpayers, the longer unfunded pension
and OPEB liabilities go unaddressed, ‘‘the larger the bill facing future
city budgets and taxpayers,’’ such that municipalities may be forced to
‘‘cut services, reduce the workforce, or raise taxes’’ to shore up
underfunded or unfunded retirement or OPEB-associated funds.81
Cities and their taxpayers also pay a price for underfunded or
unfunded pension and OPEB liabilities in the form of higher
borrowing costs (assuming the city’s finances are strong enough to
access the municipal securities market on reasonable terms), because
‘‘credit rating agencies incorporate unfunded retirement costs into
their analyses.’’82 All of these negative consequences are manifest in
Detroit.83
It is important to note that demographic trends like those present
in Detroit may exacerbate the problem of underfunding, or (at a
minimum) lead to increased demand on benefits pools. When a
workforce ages, the number of active participants paying into the
system may decrease, even as benefit payments to retired workers
increase. According to Census Bureau data, the ratio of active
members to beneficiaries of state and locally administered pension
systems has changed over time, with the result that there are now
fewer active members supporting a larger number of beneficiaries:

80. Id. at 1---2.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
83. According to the City’s bankruptcy filings, legacy liabilities (together with
Detroit’s debt load) have made it difficult, if not impossible, for Detroit to access
debt markets. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra
note 2, at 28; Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 38 (‘‘[T]he City’s ability to access
credit markets to satisfy its cash needs is compromised by its plummeting credit
ratings. The City’s credit ratings have reached historic lows and currently are below
investment grade. No major U.S. city has a lower credit crating that Detroit. As of
June 17, 2003, S&P and Moody’s had lowered Detroit’s credit ratings to CC and
Caa3, respectively.’’) (citations omitted).
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These data mean for every beneficiary receiving period payments
under a public pension defined benefit plan, there are now fewer than
two active members paying into the pension system.85 As the number
of active workers decreases and the number of retired workers
increases (in 2011, the total number of beneficiaries eligible for
periodic payments increased 4.4%), the demand for benefits
increases.86 As a result, even though pension plan revenues were up
in 2011, due to the recovery of the stock market from lows
experienced during 2008 and 2009, total payments for state and
locally-administered increased as well (they were 8.5% higher in 2011
compared to 2010, due primarily to a 7.6% increase in benefits
payments.)87 This puts pressure on benefits pools. A number of
public officials have voiced concerns about the changing ratio of
current versus former workers: Syracuse, New York Mayor Stephanie
Miner, for example, has commented that her city is ‘‘upside down’’

84. ERIKA BECKER MEDINA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC
PENSIONS: STATE- AND LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED DEFINED BENEFIT DATA SUMMARY
REPORT: 2011, at 1 (2013), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/retire/
2011summaryreport.pdf.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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with respect to health care expenses, in that the city pays more for
health care for its retired workers than it does for those still working.88
Macroeconomic forces also can intensify fiscal distress associated
with pension and OPEB liabilities. According to the United States
Census Bureau, declines in the stock market during 2008 and 2009
exacerbated the problem of underfunding in public pension systems:
89

Notably, stock market declines put pressure on state and local
government budgets at the same time that ‘‘the recession . . . cut into
state and local tax revenues, limiting the ability of governments to
make up these shortfalls.’’90
C.

Municipal Revenue Sources: Inelastic and Constrained by
Legal, Economic, and Political Forces

If municipalities already face a difficult funding mandate, legal,
economic and political constraints on revenues and debt relief make
their burdens that much heavier. When a business needs money for
88. See Jimmy Vielkind, Is Detroit Bankruptcy Prelude to Upstate Crisis?, TIMES
UNION (July 24, 2013, 6:40 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Is-Detroitbankruptcy-prelude-to-upstate-crisis-4682870.php.
89. MEDINA, supra note 84, at 2, 5.
90. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CNTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL.,
PENSION OBLIGATION BONDS 1 (2010), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2010/01/SLP_9-508.pdf (citing proprietary data).
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profit-seeking activities or to satisfy debts, it may tap a variety of
sources, including profits from existing operations, returns on
investment activity, bank loans, and/or the issuance of equity or debt
securities.91 For-profit enterprises also may free up funds for business
activities and debt service by reducing capital expenditures, cutting
expenses (e.g., through efficiency gains, headcount reductions),
selling assets, restructuring existing obligations, or entering into a
corporate combination or other transaction with a fiscally stronger
counter-party.92
Municipalities are in an entirely different position. They spend in
service of the public good, not for profit, and they cannot issue equity
securities to raise capital.93 Municipalities also cannot easily reduce
headcount or salary costs, 94 leverage or sell assets, or combine with

91. For example, AMC Entertainment Holdings, reportedly the second largest
movie theater owners in North America announced in September 2013 that it sought
to raise $400 million via an initial public offering of stock and that it planned to use
the proceeds of the offering for capital expenditures and to reduce debt. See William
Alden, AMC Aims to Raise $400 Million in I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/amc-aims-to-raise-400-million-in-i-p-o/?_r=0.
92. For example, the mining company Rio Tinto announced last year that it was
cutting expenditures and looking into selling business units to reduce its debt burden.
See Rio Targets Debt Reduction in 2014 As Costs Come Down, REUTERS, Dec. 11,
2013, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/rio-targets-debt-reduction-2014134409096.html. Likewise, Air France also announced a restructuring program last
year that including that includes layoffs, route restructuring and other measures in a
bid to reduce the airline’s debt and return to profitability. See Nicola Clark, Air
France Plans to Cut 2,800 More Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/business/air-france-plans-to-cut-2800-morejobs.html.
93. See, e.g., ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE §§ 1.1.1---1.1.2, at 3---9 (2013) (discussing municipalities’ focus
on public good); ERIC FRIEDLAND, FITCH RATINGS, SPECIAL REPORT: TOP TEN
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUNICIPAL BONDS AND CORPORATE BONDS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_rating_agency_101118_
hearing_fitch_doc3.pdf (noting corporations can raise equity, but municipalities
cannot).
94. In addition to the need for personnel to administer public infrastructure and
services, municipalities cannot easily reduce headcount because they are much more
likely than their private sector counterparts to operate in a union environment.
According to the data from the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, in
2012, public-sector workers had a union membership rate (35.9%) more than five
times higher than that of private-sector workers (6.6%), with local government
workers having the highest union membership rate at 41.7%. See Union Membership
News Release: Union Members------2012, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01232013.htm (‘‘In 2012, 7.3 million
employees in the public sector belonged to a union, compared with 7.0 million union
workers in the private sector. The union membership rate for public-sector workers
(35.9 percent) was substantially higher than the rate for private-sector workers (6.6
percent).’’). Union rates are highest at the local government level because local
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other governmental units to reduce expenses and/or raise funds.95
Instead, municipalities depend upon three principle sources of
revenue------(i) fiscal assistance from higher levels of government, (ii)
taxes, assessments and use fees; and (iii) borrowing. Each of these
sources is vulnerable, volatile, constrained and potentially risky for
municipalities and taxpayers, especially during times of financial
distress.

1.

Raising Revenues Through Grants and Tax Increases Is Legally,
Politically and Practically Difficult

Relying upon assistance from higher levels of government is risky
because the federal and state governments simply do not have the
resources, the legal authority or the political will to fund every
infrastructure project or public service need that a municipality might
have, nor can higher levels of government bail out every city, town,
village, school district, fire district, water and sewer district, etc. that
might be struggling. 96 In fact, the lack of grant money for
government payrolls include workers in heavily unionized occupations, such as
teachers, police officers, and firefighters. Id. In 2012, among full-time wage and
salary workers, union members (making no distinction between public and private
sector) earned more on average than their non-union counterparts: whereas union
members had median usual weekly earnings of $943 according to Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) data, those who were not union members had median weekly
earnings of $742. Id. Focusing on local government workers, BLS data reflect that in
2012, median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers who were
members of unions ($989) or represented by a union ($975) exceeded that of nonunion local government workers ($756). Id. The BLS attributes this disparity to a
variety of factors including but not limited to collective bargaining. See id. In
addition to a wage disparity in favor of unionized public workers, data also suggest
that state and local government employees are less likely to be laid off compared to
their private sector counterparts. ALICIA MUNNELL & REBECCA CANNON FRAENKEL,
CNTR FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS AND JOB
SECURITY (2013), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
SLP31.pdf. Taken together, this data suggests that public employers’ labor costs may
be higher and less elastic than those of non-union private sector employers.
95. Mergers and/or consolidation of municipalities have long been controversial.
See, e.g., Ted Roelofs, Should Two Towns Become One? Merger Question Moves to
Saugatuck-Douglas, BRIDGE MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://bridgemi.com/2013/10/
should-two-towns-become-one-merger-question-moves-to-saugatuck-douglas.
96. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., U.S. PUB. FIN., SPECIAL COMMENT,
POTENTIAL RISKS OF VARIABLE RATE DEBT AND INTEREST RATE SWAPS FOR U.S.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE HEIGHTENED BY ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
CRISIS 6 (2009) (on file with author) (‘‘The ability to quickly adjust revenues and
expenditures is a valuable mitigant to the potential cash flow and liquidity impact of
variable rate debt and swaps. To measure an issuer’s ability to generate additional
revenues, we consider the nature of the revenue streams that are pledged or are
available to support the issuer’s variable rate debt and swaps, as well as any legal or
procedural restrictions that would prevent the issuer from receiving sufficient
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infrastructure and services, coupled with the cost of these items,
explains why state and local governments turned to------and now
depend upon------the municipal securities market to meet funding
needs.97 In Detroit’s case, declines in state revenue sharing funds
have put pressure on the City’s finances: according to bankruptcy
filings,’’[s]tate revenue sharing [from Michigan to the City] has
decreased by $161,000,000 since 2002 (48%) and by $76,000,000
(30.6%) since 2008, due to the City’s declining population and
significant reductions in statutory revenue sharing by the State.’’98
Since revenue sharing is tied to population, the City anticipates that
‘‘[r]evenue sharing amounts will decrease further if the City’s
population continues to decline.’’99 While the federal and/or state
governments might still help Detroit, the sheer size of Detroit’s debt
makes it difficult to believe that Detroit’s problems can be solved by
grant money alone.
As for tax increases, they are difficult in the best of times. For
residents of financially strapped cities like Detroit, which face a
structural, long-term erosion of population and tax bases, they may be
impossible for all intents and purposes.100 Detroit’s residents already

revenues within the necessary time frame. For example, Moody’s considers whether
levy limits or political reluctance may prevent an issuer from increasing property
taxes or utility fees as needed. If the issuer is able and willing to raise revenues, we
consider the timeframe in which the increased collections will be received, as delayed
receipts may not help the issuer with immediate cost pressures.’’).
97. Hildreth and Zorn argue that the growth in the size and complexity of the
municipal securities market was ‘‘born[] out of necessity’’ beginning in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, as state and local governments were facing ‘‘mounting capital need
and fewer degrees of freedom to deal with these needs because of high interest rates,
inflation and a slowing economy, reduction in federal aid as a result of concern over
mounting budget deficits, and tax and expenditure limitations on state and local
governments.’’ W. Bartley Hildreth & C. Kurt Zorn, The Evolution of the State and
Local Government Municipal Debt Market Over the Past Quarter Century, 25 PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN 127, 132---33 (2005).
98. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 10.
99. PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 4.
100. See Robert Tannenwald, Are State and Local Revenue Systems Becoming
Obsolete, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., no. 4, 2001, at 28---30. As Robert Tannenwald
points out, the long-term erosion of the tax base in cities like Detroit represents a
structural problem, especially when municipal budgets shrink while public needs
increase:
An analysis of the mix of the nation’s subnational revenues reveals two
reasons why both state and local governments are so concerned about the
long-run erosion of their tax capacity. First, both depend heavily on
uncertain flows of fiscal assistance from a higher level of government.
Second, many state and local governments lack a diverse mix of ‘‘ownsource revenues’’------taxes and user charges that they collection on their own
authority.
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face an overwhelming tax burden: the City’s filings note that ‘‘[t]he
per capita tax burden on Detroit residents is the highest in
Michigan.’’101 This burden ‘‘is made heavier still by the residents’
relative inability to pay,’’ due to the low level of per capita income in
Detroit and an unemployment rate which is more than double the
national average.102 And, even if Detroit’s citizens had the means to
absorb tax increases, tax cap legislation makes the legal authority for
any such increase legally suspect. Michigan Public Act 394 of 2012
fixed Detroit’s maximum income tax rates at their current levels,103
and state law limits on property tax rates and certain utility users’
taxes are fixed and at statutory maximums.104 The City has taken the
position in bankruptcy that ‘‘even if it were advisable’’ to increase
taxes (which, according to the city ‘‘it almost certainly is not’’) the
City is legally incapable of raising revenue through additional
taxation.’’105 Finally, while the City has increased corporate tax rates
and enhanced its collection activities, such measures will not be
enough to bridge the City’s funding gap.106

Id. at 28.
101. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 20.
102. Id.
103. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.503(2) (2006); see also Orr Declaration, supra note
1, at 20---21; Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at
29---30.
104. Michigan law limits municipalities’ property tax rates to twenty mills. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 117.3 (‘‘Each city charter shall provide for all of the following: . . . (g)
the annual laying and collection taxes in a sum, except as otherwise provided by law,
not to exceed 2% of the taxable value of the real and personal property in the city.’’);
id. § 117.5 (‘‘(1) A city does not have power to do any of the following: (a) To
increase the rate of taxation now fixed by law, unless the authority to do so is given
by a majority of the electors of the city voting at the election at which the proposition
is submitted, but the increase in any case shall not be in an amount as to cause the
rate to exceed 2%, except as provided by law, of the assessed value of the real and
personal property in the city.’’). A constitutionally-required rollback limits property
tax rates to 19.952 mills (which is the rate that Detroit now charges). CITIZENS
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., DETROIT CITY GOVERNMENT REVENUES REPORT
382, at 15 (2013), available at http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2013/
rpt382.pdf. Utility users’ tax and casino wagering tax are likewise fixed at current 5%
and 10.9%, respectively, under state law. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1152(1),
432.212(4), (6), (7) (2006).
105. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 29--30.
106. See Opinion of Eligibility, supra note 1, at 80.
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Municipal Securities and Wall Street: A Critical, but Potentially
Risky, Source of Funding

Borrowing to pay for infrastructure, public services or to meet dayto-day funding needs also creates risks and burdens for cities and
their taxpayers.107 While the municipal securities market is a critical
source of funding for government activities, it carries risks for
municipalities and their taxpayers due to the nature of the security for
municipal bonds, risks associated with complex securities, limits on
citizens’ ability to monitor and police borrowing, and the difficulties
that municipalities and taxpayers face in getting relief from associated
debts.

a.

Municipal Securities

Municipal bonds are debt securities issued by states and their
political subdivisions and instrumentalities108 to pay for public projects
like the construction of water, sewer and power plants, highways,
bridges, hospitals and schools, and to meet day-to-day funding
needs.109 The municipal securities market is sometimes referred to as
the tax-exempt market because interest paid on eligible municipal
bonds may be exempt from federal income tax, state, and/or local
taxes, depending on the characteristics of the instrument and the
residence of the bondholder.110
107. See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, §§ 1.1.3---1.4, at 9---48 (discussing
municipalities’ use of debt to fund improvements, history of state and local
government indebtedness and characteristics of municipal bonds).
108. See, e.g., id. §§ 1.3---1.4, at 29---48. Instrumentalities include entities like
school districts, special districts, and public authorities. While a detailed examination
of public authorities is outside the scope of this Article, a bit of history is useful.
State and local governments began to create public authorities and special districts in
the early 1900s to build housing, coordinate economic development incentives,
provide low-cost loans, treat wastewater, operate electric utilities, and construct
hospitals, among other rationales. See William J. Quirk & Leon E. Wein, A Short
Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 521 (1971); Lynn Wilson & Clayton Eichelberger, New York State Public
Authority Reform: Where We Have Come From and Where We Need to Go, N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS’N GOV’T, L. & POL’Y J., Fall 2009, at 15---16. Over the past fifty years,
the number of authorities and special districts has grown significantly. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS: 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS,
at vii---viii, 6 (2002), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf.
109. SEC, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 5 (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf.
110. See 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The tax exemption has been the source of some
controversy over the years. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988);
Rosalyn Y. Carter & W. Bartley Hildreth, The Evolving Regulatory Environment of
State and Local Tax-Exempt Securities, 4 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. MGMT. 491, 493--97 (1992); Joan Pryde, The Ongoing Battle: Almost 70 Years of Assaults on the Tax-
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Traditionally, municipal securities issuers used two types of
bonds------general obligation bonds and revenue bonds.111 General
obligation bonds are secured by the taxing power or ‘‘faith and credit’’
of the issuer,112 and generally are subject to laws which restrain state
and local governments from incurring debt113 without voter approval
or from exceeding debt limits.114 Issuers use long-term general

Exempt Municipals, BOND BUYER, Sept. 1991, at 84. There are also taxable
municipal bonds (including fully taxable municipal bonds and municipal bonds
subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax under the IRC). I do not address this
segment of the market in this Article, nor do I examine the Build America Bond
program as authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
123 Stat. 115.
111. See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, §§ 1.3.3---1.3.4, at 37---45. In
addition to the types of securities listed above, municipal securities issuers have used
a variety of other instruments over the years. See, e.g., JOE MYSAK, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF MUNICIPAL BONDS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO MARKET EVENTS, STRUCTURES,
DYNAMICS, AND INVESTMENT KNOWLEDGE (2012). Moral obligation bonds are one
such example. According to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), a
self-regulatory organization charged with establishing fair practices and conduct rules
for firms and individuals involved in the underwriting, trading and selling of
municipal securities:
The term ‘moral obligation bond’ refers to a bond, usually issued by a state
or agency, that is secured by a non-binding covenant that any amount
necessary to make up any deficiency in pledged revenues available for debt
service will be included in the budget recommendation made to the state
legislature or other legislative body, which may appropriate moneys to
make up the shortfall. The legislature or other legislative body, however, is
not legally obligated to make such an appropriation. Unlike a general
obligation pledge, the moral obligation bond does not require voter
approval and does not have the state’s official pledge of its full faith and
credit.
See Certain Types of Municipal Securities, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAKING
BD.,
http://www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-Market/About-Municipal-Securities/
Types-of-Municipal-Securities.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). There are also socalled ‘‘double-barreled’’ bonds, which are ‘‘secured by a defined revenue source as
well as the faith and credit of an issuer with taxing power.’’ See id.
112. See, e.g., State Government Finances------Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/govs/state/definitions.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (noting
full-faith and credit debt refers to ‘‘[l]ong-term debt for which the credit of the
government concerned, implying the power of taxation, is unconditionally pledged.
Includes debt payable initially from specific taxes on nontax sources, but representing
a liability payable from any other available resources if the pledged sources are
insufficient’’). Whereas general obligation bonds issued by local governments
typically are secured by ad valorem property taxes, state government bonds tend to
be secured by sales and income taxes. See Certain Types of Municipal Securities,
supra note 111.
113. Debt limits imposed by state and local law are a form of risk management. See
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, § 4.1.1, at 207---15.
114. Historically, debt limits were enacted after the failure of projects that were
financed with bonds secured by the issuer’s faith and credit. See id. at 210. As
Amurdsky and Gillette point out, ‘‘The demise of these enterprises led to increased
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obligation bonds to finance public facilities that do not produce
revenues, or when it is thought to be inappropriate to levy fees for use
as a matter of public policy.115 If an issuer defaults on a general
obligation bond, bondholders typically have the right to compel a tax
levy or a legislative appropriation.116
Revenue bonds are bonds secured by revenues or receipts from the
funded project or other special funds, and are not backed by the
taxing power or taxable property of the borrower.117 The idea behind
revenue bonds is that issuers will use funds raised through bond
offerings to construct facilities that, ‘‘theoretically, through the
imposition of fees or charges, will generate sufficient revenues to

property taxes to pay bonds, or to default and subsequent loss of access to credit
markets, while constituents of the issuer received nothing of commensurate value in
return.’’ Id. In addition to straightforward limits, municipal entities may be subject to
state statutes designed to spread the costs of public projects over time. For example,
New York law prohibits municipalities, school districts or public corporations from
incurring indebtedness for a period longer than the useful life of the project as set
forth in the statute. See N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2013); see also CAL.
CONST. art. XVI, § 18(a) (‘‘No county, city, town, township, board of education, or
school district, shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any
purpose exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year,
without the assent of two-thirds of the voters . . . .’’). Note, however, that the courts
have recognized qualifications to requirements like those set forth in section 18. See,
e.g., L.A. Cnty. Trans. Comm’n v. Richmond, 643 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1982) (holding that
the transit commission is not a ‘‘special district’’ so a two-thirds vote is not required).
Note also that debt limits may not apply to certain court-ordered expenditures. See,
e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) (‘‘It is therefore clear that a local
government with taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit
set by state statute where there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing
the statutory limitation.’’).
115. See Ann Judith Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A
Reevaluation, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 15, 23 (1987) (‘‘Long-term general obligation bond
financing, once the mainstay of municipal financing, is used for funding those public
facilities that either do not produce revenues (for example, town halls, police stations
etc.), or for which it is considered, as a matter of public policy, inappropriate to levy
fees for public use (for example, public schools or parks).’’).
116. See, e.g., 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(3d ed. 1995).
117. See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, § 1.3.4, at 41---45. Revenues
pledged for repayment may be derived from ‘‘operation of the financed project,
grants or excise or other specified non-ad-valorum taxes.’’ Certain Types of
Municipal Securities, supra note 111. ‘‘Some revenue bonds are issued by
governmental agencies to fund facilities for essential public services,’’ like water and
sewer systems. Id. With these types of revenue bonds, the issuer typically pledges
revenues obtained through assessments towards repayment. Id. Such pledges
typically identify the specific assessments that the issuer can use to pay interest and
repay principal, the issuer’s authority and ability to increase assessments to satisfy
payment and repayment obligations, and any other, superior claims on the
assessment. Id.
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amortize the debt over the useful life of the facility.’’118 As a result,
‘‘revenue bond financing has traditionally been associated with the
construction of toll roads, bridges, and community water, sewer, and
power systems.’’119 Issuers may not be required to obtain voter
approval before issuing revenue bonds.120
More recently, issuers seeking to access lower interest rates
available at the short end of the yield curve have used complex
instruments such as variable rate demand obligations (VRDO),121
118. See Gellis, supra note 115, at 22; see also ROBERT L. BLAND, A BUDGETING
GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 171 (2d ed. 2007) (‘‘[A] revenue bond represents a
limited pledge of revenue sources to the repayment of qualifying bonds. Usually,
revenue bonds are used to finance a revenue producing project such as a public
housing complex, public hospital, toll road, water or wastewater facilities and lines, or
a parking garage. Only revenues earned from the project can be used to repay the
bonds used to build the facility. The government does not pledge its full faith and
credit to the repayment of these bonds, although it may subsidize the project with
general tax revenues, especially during the development phase. Because of the more
limited pledge, voter approval is usually not required, and the bonds incur slightly
higher interest rates because of the higher risk of default. However, investors can see
a clear link between the use of the debt and the repayment of the bonds, which
normally increases their confidence that the government will repay the debt.’’).
119. See Gellis, supra note 115, at 22.
120. BLAND, supra note 118, at 171. Conduit or industrial development bonds also
have been used for many years. See Kenneth W. Bond, Conduit Financing: A Primer
and Look Around the Corner, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N GOV’T L. & POL’Y J., Fall 2009,
at 69. Conduit bonds are debt instruments that governmental units issue for the
benefit of conduit borrowers (typically private not-for-profit entities) in furtherance
of a public purpose, such as the construction of a not-for-profit hospital, affordable
housing projects, student loan programs, and economic development and
redevelopment projects. Id. at 69---70. Not surprisingly, the concept of ‘‘public
purpose’’ has been the subject of considerable discussion in the case law. See, e.g.,
Poe v. Hillsborough Cnty., 695 So. 2d. 672 (Fla. 1997) (involving issuance of bonds
payable from sales and tourist tax proceeds to finance construction and development
of a stadium and practice field for lease to a sports franchise was valid because
primary public purpose was served by the development of recreation facilities and
tourist attractions and private benefit or gain enjoyed by franchise owner was
incidental). For a discussion of the rationale and origins of the ‘‘so-called public
purpose doctrine,’’ see AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.1, at 113---26; see also 26
U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (covering private activity and qualified bonds).
121. For a brief, ‘‘plain English’’ description of VRDOs, see Understanding
Variable Rate Demand Obligations, ELECTRONIC MUN. MARKET ACCESS,
http://emma.msrb.org/educationcenter/UnderstandingVRDOs.aspx (last visited Mar.
2, 2014). Generally speaking, VRDOs are municipal securities for which the interest
rate resets on a periodic basis, and which permit investors to liquidate their holdings
at par through a ‘‘put’’ or ‘‘tender’’ feature. Id. A dealer or remarketing agent is
responsible for reselling tendered VRDOs to new investors, and, to ensure that
investors are able to use the ‘‘put’’ or ‘‘tender’’ feature in the event a remarketing
agent is unable to locate a new purchaser. VRDOs typically operate with a liquidity
facility (typically a letter of credit or Standby Bond Purchase Agreement). Id.; see
also MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., supra note 96, at 3 (‘‘The majority of Moody’s
rated municipal issuers of variable rate demand obligations use dedicated bank
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auction rate securities and interest rate swaps in their funding plans.122
While markets for these types of instruments contracted during the
recent economic crisis, complex non-traditional securities (including
derivatives) remain very much a part of the current landscape, and
even smaller issuers now regularly use these more complicated and
potentially volatile products to meet funding needs.123 As noted
above, in Detroit’s case, the City appears to have used a range of
instruments to meet funding needs, including general obligation
bonds, revenue bonds, and more exotic instruments such as the
Certificates of Participation (COPs) and interest rate swaps discussed
below.124 Debt service and related obligations on these instruments
all have contributed to the City’s financial distress.

b.

Risks Associated with Pledging Taxing Power, Revenue Streams

Although stalwarts of municipal finance, even ‘‘plain vanilla’’
general obligation bonds and revenue bonds carry risks for issuers
and taxpayers because of the nature of the security pledged. When
issuers sell general obligation and revenue bonds to investors, they

liquidity facilities (either standby bond purchase agreements or letters of credit) to
support potential tenders by investors.’’).
122. See Registration of Municipal Advisors, 76 Fed. Reg. 824 (proposed Dec. 20,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (‘‘[T]he municipal securities market has
experienced a proliferation of complex derivative products beginning generally with
interest rate swap transactions in the mid 1980’s.’’); see also Erik Sirri, Testimony
Concerning Credit Default Swaps, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 20, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts112008ers.htm. According to the thenSEC chair in a speech from 2010, seventy percent of issuers of VRDOs have entered
into floating-to-fixed swap agreements. See Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv.
Mgmt., SEC, Remarks at Investment Company Institute 2010 General Membership
Meeting (May 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/
spch050710mls.htm.
123. See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, MUNICIPAL BOND CREDIT REPORT
FOR FOURTH QUARTER 2011, at 3 (2011) (‘‘Issuance of variable-rate demand
obligations (VRDOs), long-term municipal bonds with a floating interest rate that
resets periodically and a put feature, rose in the fourth quarter. According to
Thomson Reuters, $11.4 billion were issued in 4Q’11, more than double the amount
from 3Q’11 ($3.5 billion), but a 6.5 percent decline year-over-year ($11.4 billion).’’);
see also Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Regulation of the Municipal Securities
Market: Investors Are Not Second Class Citizens (Oct. 28, 2009), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102809ebw.htm (providing Commissioner
Elisse Walter’s commentary on use of complex financing tools).
124. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 2---3; Orr
Declaration, supra note 1, at 33---36; PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 23--34; OFFICE OF CITY MANAGER, CITY OF DETROIT: PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
18---29
(June
14,
2013),
available
at
http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Exe
cutive%20Summary%2061413.pdf.
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pledge their taxing power and dedicated revenue streams,
respectively, as security for repayment. If taxes or revenue streams
run short, the issuer may have to increase taxes and/or cut spending to
meet repayment obligations. Since taxpayers must pay government
levies, and depend upon public infrastructure and services, tax
increases, spending cuts and insolvency can have a devastating impact
on private and public life.
For example, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was forced into
receivership after it experienced difficulty repaying general obligation
bonds associated with a trash incineration project.125 In announcing
the city’s intention to miss payments due on general obligation bonds,
Harrisburg’s receiver explained that his ‘‘first priority as receiver is to
ensure that vital and necessary services such as police and fire are
maintained’’ within Harrisburg during the state of fiscal emergency.126
The receiver explained that Harrisburg would not make a payment
due on the bonds ‘‘to ensure sufficient cash flow so the citizens of
Harrisburg continue to receive essential services,’’127 reflecting the
competition for municipal resources that can arise when a
municipality experiences financial distress.
Similarly, Jefferson
County, Alabama reported punishing cuts to public services following
its default on bonds issued to pay for water and sewer services and
subsequent bankruptcy.128 Service cuts can be particularly painful and
politically difficult in distressed cities like Detroit that are already

125. See, e.g., GOB-Smacked: Harrisburg to Default on General Obligation
Bonds, INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20120309/FREE/120309870.
126. Id.; see also Romy Varghese, Harrisburg Pennsylvania Plans Default on Bond
Payments, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/201203-09/harrisburg-pennsylvania-set-to-default-on-5-dot-27-million-go-bond-payments
(explaining that Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was placed into receivership at the end of
2011, with the receiver announcing that the city would have to skip $5.27 million in
payments due on general obligation bonds to meet basic public service needs).
127. GOB-Smacked: Harrisburg to Default on General Obligation Bonds, supra
note 125; see also Varghese, supra note 126 (explaining that Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
was placed into receivership at the end of 2011, with the receiver announcing that the
city would have to skip $5.27 million in payments due on general obligation bonds to
meet basic public service needs).
128. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, In Alabama, a County That Fell Off the
Financial Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/
business/jefferson-county-ala-falls-off-the-bankruptcy-cliff.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=1& (discussing public services in Jefferson County, Alabama gutted after the
county declared bankruptcy in 2011 in the wake of a corruption scandal tied to more
than $1 billion in municipal bond debt and related interest rate swaps).
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struggling to meet basic public infrastructure and health and safety
needs.129

c.

Complex Securities Intended to Manage Pension and OPEB
Introduce Risk, May Deepen Insolvency

Using complex securities to manage debts and funding needs may
exacerbate risk for state and local governments, especially when
products carry interest rate risk, the possibility of early-termination
fees, and other variables.130 In Detroit’s case, in 2005 and 2006, the
City entered into a series of funding transactions to address accrued
liabilities associated with the city’s various pension systems ‘‘through
arranging for the issuance of certificates of participation [COPs]
supported by services contracts between the City and each of the
General Retirement System Service Corporation and the Police and
Fire Retirement System Service Corporation’’ via specially created
vehicles.’’131 The City’s goal was to ‘‘raise $1.4 billion for its
underfunded pension funds, the GRS and the PFRS.’’132 After
creating a non-profit servicing corporation for each of the two
pension funds to act as intermediary, the City entered into service
contracts with each of the corporations,133 pursuant to which the City

129. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 21---33; see also Roger Lowenstein,
Broke Town, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/
magazine/06Muni-t.html?pagewanted=all; Bobby White, Scars of Bankruptcy Linger
in Vallejo, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB10001424052970204555904577167013455352608 (discussing tax increases and
reductions in public services in Vallejo, California after the city declared bankruptcy
in 2008 in the face of declining revenues, soaring costs and municipal bond-related
obligations).
130. As the Government Finance Officers Association has commented,
Derivative products can be important interest rate management tools
that, when used properly, can increase a governmental entity’s financial
flexibility, provide opportunities for interest rate savings, alter the
pattern of debt service payments, create variable rate exposure, change
variable rate payments to fixed rate and otherwise limit or hedge
variable rate payments. Recent market experience has also shown,
however, that derivatives, when used to hedge a particular bond issue,
can limit an issuer’s flexibility with respect to such bond issue.

Government Finance Officers Association Use of Debt-Related Derivatives Products
and the Development of a Derivatives Policy (2003, 2005 and 2010), GOV’T FIN.
OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.gfoa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id
=1590 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
131. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 33; see also Opinion Regarding
Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7---8.
132. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7.
133. Id.
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pledged to make payments to the service corporations.134 Each COP
represented ‘‘an undivided proportionate interest’’ in the payments
that the City had pledged to make to the service corporations under
the service contracts.135 (The service corporations had created
funding trusts, which issued debt obligations to investors (namely, the
COPs).136) To make the COP offerings more attractive to investors,
the City purchased insurance from two bond insurers------XL Capital
Assurance, Inc., now known as Syncora, and Financial Guarantee
Insurance Company.137 At the end of fiscal year 2012, the aggregate
outstanding amount of these certificates was approximately $1.45
billion.138
Concurrently with the issuance of certain of these certificates,
certain of these special entities also entered into various pay-fixed,
receive variable interest rate swap transactions in an aggregate
notional amount of $800,000,000139 to hedge cash flows related to
interest on its COP debt obligations.’’140 An interest rate swap is a
contract between two parties to exchange a series of fixed rate and
floating rate interest payments over a defined period of time, without
exchanging the underlying principal amount, which is referred to as a
‘‘notional’’ principal amount.141 Municipal securities issuers use
interest rate swaps to convert interest rate basis (e.g., from floating to

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 33 --- 34.
139. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7; see also Orr Declaration,
supra note 1, at 34.
140. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7; see also CITY OF
DETROIT FINANCE DEP’T, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT (CAFR)
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 20, 2012, at 33 (2012), available at
http://emma.msrb.org/EP731053-EP567459-EP968879.pdf.
141. The MSRB describes interest rate swaps (and their characteristics and uses)
as follows:
A specific derivative contract entered into by an issuer or obligor with a
swap provider to exchange periodic interest payments. Typically, one party
agrees to make payments to the other based upon a fixed rate of interest in
exchange for payments based upon a variable rate. The swap contract may
provide that the issuer will pay to the swap counter-party a fixed rate of
interest in exchange for the counter-party making variable payments equal
to the amount payable on the variable rate debt.
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Interest Rate Swap Contract or Agreement,
MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BOARD, http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/
INTEREST-RATE-SWAP-CONTRACT-OR-AGREEMENT.aspx (last visited
Feb. 6, 2014).
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fixed or fixed to floating) to manage liabilities, and (ideally) to enable
issuers to lower their costs of borrowing.142
While swaps offer the potential for up-front cost savings, they
involve risks not present in other financing alternatives.143 For
example, changes in reference interest rates have caused losses in
swap positions taken by hundreds of municipalities, according to the
consulting firm National Economic Research Associates (NERA).144
NERA’s research suggests that, in some cases, as interest rates have
fallen during the crisis, municipalities have lost money on floating-tofixed swap agreements that they first entered into to protect against
rising interest rates. In other cases, even though interest rates have
fallen, municipalities have found that floating payments have
increased due to other market developments.145
In Detroit’s case, the service corporations agreed to convert the
floating rate of interest on certain of the COPs into a fixed
payment.146 This was, according to Judge Rhodes, a wager by the
City, because ‘‘if the floating interest rates exceeded a certain rate,
the Swap Counterparties would make payments to the Service
Corporations. But if the floating interest rates sank below a certain
rate, the Service Corporations would make payments to the Swap
Counterparties.’’147 In addition to the risk that interest rate would
move in a direction disadvantageous to the City, the City also was at
risk if there was an ‘‘event of default’’ or ‘‘termination event,’’

142. See Donohue, supra note 122.
143. See MASSIMILIANO DE SANTIS, NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS.,
DEMYSTIFYING FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: INTEREST RATE SWAPS AND MUNICIPAL
DERIVATIVES 2 (2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1006&context=massi_de_santis.
144. Id. at 7. Among other risks, swaps carry counterparty credit risk, interest rate
risk, and basis risk. NEIL O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 249
(6th ed. 2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES:
OVERVIEW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND REGULATION 51---52 (2012)
(‘‘Termination risk is the risk that the swap may terminate or be terminated before its
expiration. Swap agreements allow for termination of the swap by either party in the
case of certain events, such as payment defaults on the swap or credit rating
downgrades. For example, if the issuer triggers early termination, it could owe a
termination payment reflecting the value of the swap under the market conditions at
that time. If market rates have changed to the issuer’s disadvantage (e.g., the issuer is
a fixed-rate payer and interest rates have declined), the issuer will be ‘out of the
money’ on the swap, that is, the fixed rate that the issuer is paying to the counterparty
is higher than the current market rate . . . . A termination of a swap can result in a
substantial unexpected payment obligation.’’).
145. DE SANTIS, supra note 143.
146. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7.
147. Id.
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according to Judge Rhodes.148 Judge Rhodes found that if either
event occurred, ‘‘the Swap Counterparties could terminate the swaps
and demand a potentially enormous termination payment.’’149
In his Opinion Regarding Eligibility, Judge Rhodes found that due
to a dramatic decline in interest rates in 2008, the City ‘‘lost
catastrophically on the swaps bet.’’150 With respect to the POCrelated swaps, the City stated in its Comprehensive Annual Financial
Report (CAFR) for the fiscal year ended June 2012 that ‘‘[a] total of
$439.3 million of the negative fair value of derivatives are interest rate
swaps associated with the City’s POCs.’’151 The CAFR also detailed
consequences (termination fees, rating downgrades, etc.) that the City
then was facing as a result of its difficulties meeting obligations
associated with the POCs and swaps.152 As reported by Judge

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 8.
Id.
See id.
See CITY OF DETROIT FINANCE DEP’T, supra note 140, at 14.
Id. at 14, 33. According to the CAFR,

On January 8, 2009, due to POC debt rating and Swap Insurer’s rating
declines, the City received formal notice from the Swap Counterparty to
four of the eight Swap agreements stating that an event had occurred, which
if not cured by the City, would constitute an Additional Termination Event.
On January 14, 2009, the City also received formal notice from the Swap
Counterparty to the four remaining Swap Agreements. In June 2009, the
City and the Counterparties agreed to an amendment to the Swap
Agreements, thereby eliminating the Additional Termination Event and the
potential for an immediate demand for payment to the Swap
Counterparties.
As part of the amended Swap Agreements, the
Counterparties waived their right to termination payments. Additionally,
the City was required to direct its Wagering Tax Revenues to a Trust as
collateral for the quarterly payment to the Counterparties and agreed to
other new termination events. The termination events under the amended
Swap Agreement include a provision for the Counterparties to terminate
the amended Swap Agreement and demand a termination payment if POCs
ratings are downgraded below ‘‘Ba3’’ or equivalent.
In March 2012, the risk of the amended Swap Agreement termination
arose with the credit rating downgrade below ‘‘Ba3’’. The amount of swap
termination payments would be based upon a variety of factors such as the
various Swap Counterparties’ financial pricing models, underlying variable
debt, index or reference rates, and the point of pricing. Any termination
payments would be allocated based on the notional allocation percentage of
the affected POCs, between the governmental and business-type activities
as of the point of liability accrual. If the termination events are not cured,
there presently exists significant risk in connection with the City’s ability to
meet the cash demands under the terms of the amended Swap Agreements.
As of this report date, the City is negotiating with the counterparties to
come up with an acceptable course of action due to the credit rating
downgrade. At June 30, 2012, the negative fair value of the POC swap
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Rhodes, ‘‘[t]he City estimates that the damage will be approximately
$45,000,000 per year for the next ten years.’’153
Detroit is not the only municipality to struggle with interest rate
swaps. In 1994, the relatively wealthy community of Orange County,
California declared bankruptcy after a disastrous foray into the
derivatives market.154 Fifteen years later, in 2009, Jefferson County,
Alabama declared bankruptcy after federal authorities brought
charges against the former mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, J.P.
Morgan Securities, Inc. and two J.P. Morgan’s former managing
directors in connection with an alleged illegal payment scheme
whereby the managing directors funneled money to close friends of
county commissioners to win bond offering business for J.P. Morgan
Securities and to induce county officials to select J.P. Morgan’s
affiliated bank as swaps provider.155 Due to the way Jefferson

liabilities was $354.7 million for the governmental activities and totaled
$439.3 million for the primary government.
Id. at 33.
153. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 8.
154. For discussion of Orange County’s bankruptcy and threatened default, see
generally Report of Investigation in the Matter of County of Orange, California as it

Relates to the Conduct of the Members of the Board of Supervisors, Exchange Act
Release No. 36761, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 24, 1996),
http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/mbonds/publicof.htm#PO1; see also Ann Judith
Gellis, Municipal Securities Market: Same Problems------No Solutions, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 427, 454 (1996) (describing Orange County crisis and losses); Merton H. Miller &
David J. Ross, The Orange County Bankruptcy and Its Aftermath: Some New
Evidence, J. DERIVATIVES, Summer 1997, at 51---60. For a brief discussion of market
risk control failure and the Orange County situation, see Kimberly Krawiec, More

than Just ‘‘New Financial Bingo’’: A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding
Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 27---28 (1997) (citing Municipal Finance Issues: Hearings
Concerning the Municipal Securities Market Before the House Comm. on
Commerce, 105th Cong. 1995 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)).
155. See Press Release, SEC, J.P. Morgan Settles SEC Charges in Jefferson
County, Ala. Illegal Payments Scheme, SEC Separately Charges Two Former
Managing
Directors
at
Firm
(Nov.
4,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-232.htm; see also Mary Williams Walsh,
Alabama Governor Fails to Prevent County’s Record $4 Billion Bankruptcy Filing,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/us/alabama-governorfails-to-prevent-jefferson-countys-record-4-billion-bankruptcy-filing.html?_r=0
(reporting that at $4 billion, Jefferson County’s bankruptcy was then the largest in
history, overtaking previous record (a $1.7 billion bankruptcy filing by Orange
County, Calif. in December 1994)). On April 30, 2008, the Commission charged
Larry Langford (the then-mayor of Birmingham, Alabama and former president of
the Jefferson County Commission) and certain industry professionals with securities
fraud in connection with an alleged kick-back scheme involving the county’s efforts
to finance improvements to its water and sewer systems, as required by
environmental laws. Complaint at 8---33, SEC v. Langford, No. CV-08-B-0761-S (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 30, 2008). Langford also was charged in a parallel criminal case for
allegedly sending more than $7 million in county bond business to an investment
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County’s offerings and swaps transactions were structured, the annual
payment on Jefferson County’s debt jumped from $53 million to $636
million between 2008 and 2009.156 As debt obligations grew, and the
county’s finances worsened,157 sewer taxes skyrocketed and public
services were stripped to the bone.158 More recently, Oakland,
California159 and the State of New Jersey160 (among others)161
reportedly have wrestled with swap-related obligations.162

banker in return for bribes worth $241,843. Indictment, United States v. Langford,
647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011). On October 28, 2009, Langford was found guilty in a
parallel criminal case on sixty counts of bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax
evasion. See Langford, 647 F.3d at 1309, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1121 (2012); see also
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Appeals Court Upholds Former Birmingham
Mayor and Jefferson County Commission President’s Conviction, (Aug. 5, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/aln/News/August%202011/August%205,%
202011%20County%20Commision.htm. The Commission also brought related cases
against J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. and two of its former managing directors in
connection with the alleged scheme. See Complaint, SEC v. Charles LeCroy &
Douglas McFaddin, No. CV-09-U-2238-S (N.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21280.pdf; JP Morgan Securities
Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9078, Exchange Act Release No. 60928, 2009 WL
3652405 (Nov. 4, 2009).
156. See Matt Taibbi, Looting Main Street, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/looting-main-street-20100331. On March
3, 2009, certain of the county’s interest rate swap agreements were terminated. JP
Morgan, 2009 WL 3652405, at *8. ‘‘On March 6, 2009, J.P. Morgan Securities’
affiliated commercial bank notified the County that it owed $647,804,118.00 as the
result of the termination of the Swap Agreements.’’ Id. According to Jefferson
County’s official budget for 2008---2009, budget revenues were $289 million. See
JEFFERSON CNTY. BUDGET MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICIAL OPERATING BUDGET
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA FISCAL YEAR OCTOBER 1, 2008---SEPTEMBER 20, 2009,
at 55 (2008), available at http://jeffconline.jccal.org/Sites/Jefferson_County/
Documents/Budget%20Management%20Office/2009-Budget-BMO.pdf.
157. Early in 2008, ratings agencies downgraded the County’s sewer bond insurers,
and shortly thereafter, also downgraded the County’s approximately $3.2 billion of
sewer bonds. In February 2008, the auction market for the County’s auction-rate
sewer bonds failed. See JEFFERSON CNTY, ALA., SEWER REVENUE WARRANTS:
MATERIAL EVENT NOTICE 1---7 (2008), available at http://blog.al.com/bn/2008/02/
Material%20Event%20Notice-%20Sewer%20Bond%202-28-08.pdf; Shelly Sigo,
Jefferson County Ala., Takes Sewer Rating Hit, BOND BUYER (Feb. 26, 2008),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_36/-284135-1.html.
158. See Taibbi, supra note 156.
159. In 1998, Oakland reportedly issued variable rate bonds in order to help the
city finance its pension obligations. See Oaklanders Demand End to Swap Ripoff,
SEIU
LOCAL
1021
(June
12,
2012),
http://www.seiu1021.org/?s=
Oakland%E2%80%99s+Goldman+Sachs+Rate+Swap&submit-btn=. To protect
against interest rate spikes, the city entered into an agreement with Goldman Sachs
to swap its variable rate for a fixed rate obligation. Id. Instead of spiking, however,
‘‘interest rates dropped to about half what the city was paying to Goldman Sachs.’’ Id.
Although the bonds were refunded for additional debt in 2005, the swap agreement
was structured to continue until 2021, and requires the city to pay $5 million per year
until that time. Id. Terminating the swap reportedly would cost Oakland $19 million.
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Taxpayers Responsible in Ways that Shareholders Are Not

In addition to the spending mandate and constrained sources of
revenue, municipalities and their citizens also have fewer, less
effective and more expensive monitoring and policing tools to
manage borrowing and spending risk.163 In the private sector,

See id.; Aaron Lucchetti, Interest Rate Deals Sting Cities, States, WALL ST. J., Mar.
22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870377550457513593021132
9798.html.
160. See Jarrett Renshaw, N.J. Spends $122M to Partially Terminate Interest Rate
NJ.COM
(Feb.
9,
2011),
Swap
Deals
in
Past
Month,
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/02/nj_spends_122m_to_partially_te.html
(‘‘New Jersey spent more than $122 million last month to partially terminate eight
interest-rate swap deals . . . . [T]he [New Jersey Economic Development] [A]uthority
issued $1.1 billion in new bonds to cover the partial termination cost of eight swaps,
as well as to refinance roughly $992 million worth of . . . bonds. About $122 million
of that borrowed money went to fees paid to Goldman Sachs, UBS and Deutsche
Bank to terminate the swaps.’’); Letter from Robert Lamb, President, Lamont Inv.
Advisers Corp., to James Petrino, N.J. Office of Pub. Fin. (Feb. 1, 2011), available at
http://media.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/other/nj-swap-portfolio.pdf
(attaching
valuation report for details regarding the value of the outstanding swaps).
161. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Exotic Deals Put Denver Schools Deeper in
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/business/
06denver.html?pagewanted=all (detailing how and why the Denver School District
entered into interest rate swap agreements and the eventual financial impact on the
district); Press Release, Dep’t of the Auditor Gen., Philadelphia Derivatives Show
Danger of Failure to Rein in Wall Street Penn. (Apr. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.auditorgen.state.pa.us/department/press/phillyderivativesshowdangerfailr
eininwallstreet.html (detailing net negative values for interest rate swaps for the City
of Philadelphia, the School District of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Authority for
Industrial Development, and the Philadelphia Intergovernmental Cooperation
Authority). Note that the constitutionality of school financing systems, while beyond
the scope of this Article, has been litigated heavily over the years. See, e.g., Serrano
v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). In some cases, municipalities that have suffered
losses due to swap agreements have sued their swap providers, often resulting in
settlements or the restructuring of swap agreements. In 2009, for example, the
Alabama Public School and College Authority (APSCA) sued to void a swaption
that it had sold to J.P. Morgan and refused to make payments on the swaption until a
decision was rendered. See Shelly Sigo, Judge OKs Deal in Alabama, J.P. Morgan
Swaption Suit, BOND BUYER (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.bondbuyer.com/
issues/119_496/judge-okays-deal-in-alabama-1021520-1.html.
According to press
reports, the APSCA agreed to pay a $19 million in settlement to J.P. Morgan to
resolve the dispute. Id.
162. See Chung, supra note 34, at 1474---77; see also discussion in note 156 of the
Jefferson County case.
163. See, e.g., DEAN MICHAEL MEAD, GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BUREAU,
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT YOUR LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S FINANCES: A
GUIDE TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2 (2d ed. 2011); Jerold L. Zimmerman, The
Municipal Accounting Maze: An Analysis of Political Incentives, 15 J. ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH 107 (1977). For a discussion of limits of private ordering as a risk
management tool in other contexts, see Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s
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investors can decide if and when to invest in a particular corporation’s
securities. If an equity investor becomes unhappy, she may be able to
express her displeasure in a variety of ways, including: (i) voting
against incumbent board members during annual director elections,
and proposing replacement slates of directors; (ii) making proposals
during meetings and/or through the proxy system; and (iii) voting
against major transactions proposed by incumbent boards and
management.164 Corporate security holders also may use exit
discipline------i.e., selling securities------to express disapproval. Certainly,
there are variations in voting rights across security-types and across
corporations. Moreover, not every corporate security (debt or
equity) is liquid or freely transferrable. The power of the shareholder
vote, and shareholders’ access to the proxy, also are limited in
important respects.165 That said, because shareholder losses are
generally limited to the amount of the shareholder’s investment,
shareholder losses are capped even if the shareholder is unsuccessful
in convincing the company to change course, and even if there are
transaction costs associated with exit.
With municipal securities, voter/taxpayers take the place of
shareholders, and municipal officers take the place corporate officers
and directors. Once a taxpayer ‘‘buys in’’ to the municipal enterprise
through the purchase of residential real estate or the use of municipal
services, her choices are limited.166 She must pay government levies
whether or not she agrees with a particular expenditure. She may
vote against bond offerings------if the offering is subject to a vote------but
her point of view may not prevail, and opportunities to challenge
issuances through litigation are limited.167 If she wishes to unseat

Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 569---572
(2011) (examining limits of private ordering on risk shifting in derivatives markets).
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211(b) (2004) (‘‘Unless directors are elected
by written consent in lieu of an annual meeting as permitted by this subsection, an
annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date
and at a time designated by or in the manner provided in the by-laws.’’); id. § 212
(referencing rights of ‘‘[e]ach stockholder entitled to vote at a meeting of
stockholders or to express consent or dissent to a corporate action’’ to designate a
proxy); id. § 216 (referencing number of shares required to constitute a quorum for
voting purposes); id. § 251(c) (referencing shareholder voting rights with respect to
merger/ consolidation); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014) (shareholder proposals).
165. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (setting forth eligibility and procedural
requirements for including a shareholder proposal in a corporation’s proxy
materials).
166. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 163, at 2; Gellis, supra note 115, at 59---61;
Zimmerman, supra note 163.
167. According to Amurdsky & Gillette, ‘‘In recent years, courts and legislatures
have restricted the ability of taxpayers to contest the issuance of municipal bonds.’’
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government officials responsible for particular offerings, she may
have to wait until the next election (assuming the local officials
behind the offering are elected) or pressure government officials to
terminate appointed personnel.168 She also may have to deal with
government structures that entrench existing managers and make it
difficult for taxpayers to alter the composition of decision-making
bodies.169 If the taxpayer is not happy with this state of affairs, she
may be left with having to sell her real estate and move out of town.170
Moving, however, is likely to involve significant transaction costs,
especially when real estate markets are in turmoil.
In Detroit’s case, with its diminished and impoverished population
and rock-bottom property values, opportunities for policing and exit
discipline may be even more limited and expensive than usual.
Moreover, corruption------and the inability of the ordinary citizen to
rein in public officials’ malfeasance------may have exacerbated Detroit’s
distress. On October 13, 2013, Detroit’s former mayor Kwame M.
Kilpatrick was sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison after being
convicted on dozens of counts racketeering and extortion, making
him one of eighteen public officials convicted of corruption during his

AMURDSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 93, § 2.7.4, at 100. As Amurdsky and Gillette
explain, judicial review may be limited to specific issues, such as ‘‘(1) the regularity of
the proceedings at which the bonds are issued; (2) the validity of the bonds; and (3)
the legality of the purpose for which the bonds are issued.’’ Id. (citing Ward v.
Commonwealth, 685 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); see also City of
Lubbock v. Isom, 615 S.W. 2d 171 (Tex. 1981) (holding challengers of city bond issues
were barred from suing under Texas statute which provided that judicial decree
validating bonds constituted permanent injunction against any action or proceeding
contesting validity of bonds if no appeal taken in statutorily proscribed time frame).
168. As Professor Gellis points out, using the New York City bond crisis of the
mid-1970s as an example, politicians may be incentivized to focus on the potential for
short-term gains rather than the possibility of long-term costs or losses. Gellis, supra
note 115, at 47---50. This can lead to sub-optimal decision-making on issues relating to
municipal finance. Id.
169. There is empirical research suggesting that certain governance structures may
impact the likelihood and impact of restatements by municipal securities issuers.
Professor Baber and his co-authors investigated the role of voter oversight in
connection with accounting restatements in the municipal context and found that
‘‘restatements are more likely, and the increase in debt financing costs following
restatements are more substantial, when municipal managers are entrenched------that
is, when statutory provisions restrict the ability of voters to intervene directly in the
municipal decision-making process or to quickly alter the composition of the city
council.’’ WILLIAM R. BABER, ET AL., ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS, GOVERNANCE
AND
MUNICIPAL
DEBT
FINANCING
29---30
(2011),
available
at
http://www.centerforpbbefr.rutgers.edu/2012PBFEAM/papers/089Accounting%20Restatements,%20Governance,%20and%20Municipal%20Debt%20
Financing_William%20Baber_Aug.%202011.pdf.
170. See, e.g., Gellis, supra note 115, at 59---61.
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tenure.171 On December 24, 2013, banks involved in deals negotiated
during Kilpatrick’s tenure reportedly agreed to compromise certain
claims relating to interest rate swap transactions following mediation
overseen by United States District Court Chief Judge Gerald Rosen
and United States Bankruptcy Court Judge Elizabeth Perris.172
According to the mediators’ recommendation, the agreement (if
approved) would ‘‘allow[] the City to refinance its debt at more
favorable terms, saving approximately $65 million from the original
terms of the Forbearance Agreement, approximately $25 million at
the time of the hearing on the assumption of the Agreement, and
permitting the City to reduce its interim loan (commonly referred to
as the DIP loan) by up to an additional $65 million.’’173 The mediators
also argued that the proposed agreement would ‘‘further provide
much needed financial flexibility by freeing up casino revenues held
in the collateral account providing funds needed to maintain
operations and bolster city services,’’ according to the mediators.174
With respect to the SWAP counterparties, the mediators stated that
the proposed agreement would ‘‘enable them to avoid the risk of
losing all that they invested and further avoid the lawsuit the City
threatened to bring which, if successful, could have forced them to
disgorge and pay back to the City all of the payments they received
under the swaps.’’175
The proposed compromise between the City and SWAP
counterparties was subject to court approval, and on January 16, 2014
Judge Rhodes rejected it, reportedly stating that the proposed deal
was ‘‘just too much money’’ for the City.176 Just two weeks later, the

171. Steve Yaccino, Kwame M. Kilpatrick, Former Detroit Mayor, Sentenced to 28
Years
in
Corruption
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
13,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/us/former-detroit-mayor-kwame-kilpatricksentencing.html?_r=0; see also Indictment, United States v. Kilpatrick, No. CR-10200403-NGE (E.D. Mich.) (Dec. 15, 2010).
172. See Mediators’ Recommendation for Approval of Settlement Between the
Debtor & SWAP Counter-Parties, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013
WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2013); see also Brent Snavely & Joe
Guillen, Detroit’s Retirement Systems to Challenge Renegotiated Swaps Settlement
with
Banks,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS,
Dec.
26,
2013,
http://www.freep.com/article/20131226/NEWS01/312260107/Retirement-systemsbankruptcy-settlement.
173. Mediators’ Recommendation for Approval of Settlement Between the Debtor
& SWAP Counter-Parties, supra note 172, at 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Disallows Plan by Detroit to Pay Off
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/judge-
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City filed a declaratory judgment action against service corporations
and funding trusts involved in the COPs (as noted above, certain of
Detroit’s swaps were connected to the COP transactions) seeking the
entry of an order stating that all contractual obligations incurred by
the City in connection with the COP transactions are ‘‘unenforceable
and void ab initio.’’177 In a nutshell, the City’s complaint alleges that
the service corporations and funding trusts formed in connection with
the COP transactions swaps were a sham and an unlawful attempt to
evade debt restrictions.178 This proceeding is pending as of the date of
publication.
D. Default and Discharge Options Limited

1.

Bankruptcy Is Complicated, Not a Get Out Of [Debtor] Jail Free
Card

Finally, constraints on default and discharge also make it difficult
for cities (and thus their taxpayers) to obtain relief from debts. As is
clear from Detroit’s example, municipal bankruptcy operates very
differently from individual and entity bankruptcy models. While nonstate entities179 like Detroit may be able to seek bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 9, there are meaningful eligibility
requirements,180 involuntary bankruptcies are not permitted,181

rejects-detroits-deal-to-exit-swapcontracts/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1.
177. Complaint of City of Detroit, Michigan for Declaratory Judgment &
Injunctive Relief at 19, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931
(Jan. 31, 2014).
178. Id. at 18---19.
179. As constitutionally recognized sovereigns, states cannot declare or be forced
into bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (failing to list states among the entities
permitted to seek bankruptcy protection); id. § 903 (stating Chapter 9 ‘‘does not limit
or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality
of or in such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of the
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise,’’ with two exceptions------a state
law prescribing a method of composition of municipal debt does not bind any nonconsenting creditor, nor does any judgment entered under such state law bind a
nonconsenting creditor); id. § 904 (limiting the power of a bankruptcy court to
‘‘interfere with------(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2)
any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of
any income-producing property’’ unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides).
But see United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (holding that the federal
government may grant bankruptcy relief to a state under Chapter 10 without
violating the Constitution).
180. To be eligible for Chapter 9, an entity must meet the five criteria listed in
§ 109(c). 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). Specifically, the entity must 1) be a municipality, as
defined by the Code; 2) be specifically authorized to be a bankruptcy debtor; 3) be
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liquidation is not an option, and the issuer’s powers to operate (and
thus make payments on debt) may not be affected.182 For example,
because § 928 of the bankruptcy code provides that special revenues
obtained by a municipal debtor after a bankruptcy filing are subject to
liens granted prior to the bankruptcy filing,183 eligible ‘‘revenue
bondholders are entitled to receive revenue pledged to them without
any interference and on a timely basis.’’184 General obligation
bondholders also may continue to receive payment following a
Chapter 9 filing if the state statute authorizing the issuance contained
a statutory lien.185 The bankruptcy code also provides that payments

insolvent as defined by § 101(32)(C); 4) genuinely desire to effect a plan to adjust its
debts that exist as of the commencement of the case; and 5) satisfy one of the four
alternative statutory requirements for negotiating with its creditors before filing its
petition. Id. The debtor bears the burden of establishing that it meets each of these
statutory requirements. See, e.g., In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 599 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1995). With respect to the ‘‘specifically authorized’’ criteria, fewer than half
of the states authorize municipal bankruptcy petitions, assuming the filing
municipality meets certain conditions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-81-3 (LexisNexis
2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-603 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-74-103 (2010);
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3903 (2013); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 66.400 (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4741, 39:619---620
(2013); MINN. STAT. § 471.831 (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 427.100 (West 2010); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 7-7-132 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-402 (2012); N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW
§ 85.80 (McKinney 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 283 (West 2010); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 6-1-10 (2004); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 140.001 (West 2008); WASH.
REV. CODE § 39.64.040 (2012). Other states either prohibit municipal bankruptcy
petitions or allow them only if the state approves the petition. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 7-566 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 218.01 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:619
(2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1566 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-40 (West
2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.36 (West 2012);
53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5571 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7 (2009). Three states have
enacted statutes providing limited authorization for specific municipal
issuers/debtors. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-32-102 (2013) (taxing, drainage and
irrigation districts); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 320/9(b)(4) (West 2008) (power); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 3855/1-20(b)(15); OR. REV. STAT. § 548.705 (West 2010) (drainage and
irrigation districts).
181. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 904 (2012).
182. For example, despite the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. § 922(d) allows municipalities to continue paying pledged special revenue,
or revenue bonds without obtaining the court’s permission or notifying other
creditors. See id. § 922(d). By comparison, corporate reorganizations occur in the
content of the potential liquidation of the debtor. See id. § 1123(a).
183. See id. § 928.
184. See JAMES SPIOTTO, ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS? HOW STATES AND
INVESTORS DEAL WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 56 (2012).
For a discussion of the legislative history of this provision, see id. at 54---56.
185. Id. at 58. As Spiotto and his co-authors point out, this approach was used in
the Orange County bankruptcy case, where the court held that the lien securing tax
and revenue anticipate notes arising under state law was a statutory lien that survived
the county’s Chapter 9 petition. Id. (citing In re Cnty. of Orange, 189 B.R. 499 (S.D.
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received by holders of municipal bonds or note obligations within
ninety days of the commencement of a municipal bankruptcy petition
are not preferences subject to claw-back.186 Due to provisions like
these, issuers may remain obligated to repay municipal bond debt
despite seeking bankruptcy protection.187 At a minimum, as in
Detroit’s case, these issues present knotty legal questions that cost
time and money to resolve.
Even when municipal bankruptcy (and debt adjustment) is
available, it is not a ‘‘cure-all,’’ especially for taxpayers and public
workers. Even before debates over eligibility and debt priority
erupted in the Detroit bankruptcy, for example, the bankruptcies in
Vallejo, California and Jefferson County, Alabama highlighted costs
associated with Chapter 9. Vallejo, California filed for Chapter 9
bankruptcy protection in May 2008 in the face of revenue constraints
and expanding debt load, over the objections of public workers.188
Although Vallejo’s bankruptcy filing gave the city breathing room to
adjust debts owed to various creditor constituencies, respite came at a
price.189
Through the bankruptcy process, the city adjusted
Cal. 1995)). According to Spiotto, ‘‘at least thirty-two states recognize some form of
a statutory lien in relation to their bond obligations.’’ Id.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 926 (2012).
187. Some thirty states have laws in place that give holders of general obligations
bonds and certain other securities issued by municipalities rights of first payment
from certain revenue streams even during bankruptcy. See, e.g., SPIOTTO ET AL.,
supra note 184, at 54---55. For a general discussion of municipal insolvency, see
Alexander M. Laughlin, Municipal Insolvencies: An Article on the Treatment of
Municipalities Under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, MUN. FIN. J., Summer
2005, at 37---59.
188. See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R.
262 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Carolyn Jones, Vallejo’s Bankruptcy Ends After 3 Tough
Years, S.F. GATE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=
/c/a/2011/11/01/BARI1LPAHN.DTL. State and local governments have been
battered by the subprime mortgage crisis and resulting economic downturn in a
variety of ways in addition to those discussed here. For example, the National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States
found that ‘‘losses on SIVs [structured investment vehicles] and other mortgagetainted investments also battered local government investment pools across the
country, some of which held billions of dollars in these securities.’’ FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (2011), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
189. See LEON R. BARSON ET AL., CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING
MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 9 (2011) (noting
Chapter 9 filing gives distressed municipalities time------and ‘‘breathing room’’------to
develop debt adjustment plans). In In re City of Vallejo, the municipality sought to
reject its collective bargaining agreements with public workers less than one month
after filing its petition for relief under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 403

814

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

compensation and benefits packages with city workers, with the
reported result that, ‘‘city staffers now contribute more to their health
insurance, new firefighters have lower pension plans and the fire
department no longer has minimum staffing requirements.’’190
Although the city has emerged from bankruptcy, sales taxes remain
high, public services remain ‘‘hollowed-out’’ and there are
neighborhoods with dilapidated homes.191 City workers and taxpayers
also have had to deal with approximately $8 million in legal fees that
the city incurred in connection with the bankruptcy.192 According to
press reports, however, Vallejo paid bondholders in full and on
time.193 Likewise, in the Jefferson County case, county residents
suffered lasting harm in the wake of the political corruption scheme,
the default on municipal bonds associated with water and sewer
improvement projects and, eventually, the County’s $4 billion
bankruptcy filing.194 According to press reports, the county’s sewers
still do not function properly, county services are operating at

B.R. at 72. The court held that the less stringent standards for rejection of union
contracts available under 11 U.S.C. § 365 and the Bildisco line of cases applied to
Vallejo’s petition versus the more exacting standards for rejection of union contracts
under 11 U.S.C. § 1113. See id. at 78 (applying the Bildisco standard for rejection of
executor contracts, which permits a debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement
under 11 U.S.C. § 365 if it shows ‘‘1) the collective bargaining agreement burdens the
estate; 2) after careful scrutiny, the equities balance favors contract rejection; and 3)
‘reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made, and are
not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.’’’ (citing NLRB. v. Bildisco
& Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984))).
190. See Jones, supra note 188. Fire and police unions had opposed Vallejo’s
bankruptcy filing on the grounds that the city used bankruptcy strategically as a
means of avoiding contractual obligations respecting benefits. Id.
191. See, e.g., White, supra note 129 (discussing tax increases and reductions in
public services in Vallejo, California after the city declared bankruptcy in 2008 in the
face of declining revenues, soaring costs and municipal bond-related obligations).
192. Id. Among other reasons for the legal fees, the city and certain of its public
workers engaged in extensive litigation over whether the bankruptcy filing was
necessary, or whether it was means of avoiding collective bargaining obligations. See
Opposition to Debtor’s Application for Order Setting June 9 Deadline for Filing
Objections to Petition, In re City of Vallejo, No. 08-26813 (MSM) (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
May 28, 2008).
193. Patrick McGee, Vallejo Shows the Way, BOND BUYER (Feb. 28, 2001),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_40/vallejo_muni_bankruptcy-1023803-1.html.
According to Hildreth and Zorn, the San Jose School District in California also paid
its debt service on schedule despite seeking bankruptcy protection in 1983 ‘‘due, in
part, to Proposition 13 tax limits, but, more pointedly, to void a labor arbitration
award.’’ Hildreth & Zorn, supra note 97, at 145.
194. As noted, I discuss the Jefferson County case in my previously published
work, Chung, supra note 34, at 1474---77.
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skeleton crew levels, and the debt still exists.195 As one county
resident reportedly said, ‘‘Everyone wonders how the county will ever
get out of this financial mess.’’196

a.

Default, Discharge and Bailouts Are Disfavored for Political
Reasons, Too.

Political realities also limit municipalities’ access to debt relief. In
some cases, local government issuers may not reach the point of
default or bankruptcy because the state steps in and takes control. As
Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank explained in 2008 during
Congressional hearings on turmoil in the municipal bond market:
No State, no State legislators, no governor, can allow any one of
its municipalities to default because then every other municipality
would pay through the nose. So that is why this is not just some
charity here; this is self-defense.
The particular municipality, you might pity the municipal
workers there. Services may get cut back. Maybe the trash won’t get
picked up. But we can guarantee you, we have all been there, you
can’t do that [default]. Because if any one municipality falters, every
municipality in that State would pay, and there isn’t a State governor
and legislature in the country who doesn’t understand that, and
that’s why the State guarantee is such a good one.197

Similarly, as the Securities and Exchange Commission observed in
one of its reports on the municipal securities market, bankruptcy
generally is a last resort for distressed municipalities:
The low number of bankruptcies in the municipal sector can be
attributed to several factors, both legal and practical, including: the
negative effects of a bankruptcy filing on the credit ratings not only
of the municipalities themselves, but also the states in which they are
located, which means that bankruptcy is often used only as a last
resort; the public nature of bankruptcy; state restrictions against
filing under Chapter 9; and the negative effects on access to future
195. Walsh, supra note 128 (noting that public services in Jefferson County,
Alabama were gutted after the county declared bankruptcy in 2011 in the wake of a
corruption scandal tied to more than $1 billion in municipal bond debt and related
interest rate swaps). New Jersey also has faced considerable turmoil in its efforts to
deal with the fiscal problems exposed by the case against it. See, e.g., State Budgets:
CBS
NEWS
(Dec.
19,
2010),
The
Day
of
Reckoning,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/state-budgets-the-day-of-reckoning/1.
196. Walsh, supra note 128. As noted, Detroit is not alone in this. See
Lowenstein, supra note 129; Varghese, supra note 126; White, supra note 129.
197. Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns, and States: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 25 (2008) (statement of Rep.
Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
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capital markets, which motivates financially distressed municipalities
to rely on mechanisms other than Chapter 9 (including state
refinancing authorities, receiverships, and commissions) to
restructure debt.198

‘‘States that intervene often want to avoid the stigma that would
come from their cities filing for bankruptcy protection,’’199 as well as
reduce impacts on other municipalities within the state associated
with contagion.200 In Vallejo, California, for example, the city
reportedly was not able to access public debt markets for three years
during its bankruptcy (2008-2011) for money to maintain its streets or
replace its aging police cars and fire trucks.201 In addition, after the
city made extensive cuts to its police and fire fighter forces, crime
rates rose, as did response times to fire and medical emergencies.202
Declines in quality of life in the city------which made the national
news------caused Vallejo to lose a portion of its population even as cities
in the area gained residents.203 Concerns about contagion also have
merit. In the wake of Detroit’s filing, other Michigan municipalities
reportedly were forced to delay planned offerings. 204

b.

Cuts . . . A Drop in the Bucket, Significant Harm to Public Life

Finally, while budget cuts may be an important tool in solving
municipal fiscal crisis, Detroit’s example suggests that cities in
financial extremis cannot ‘‘cut’’ their way to solvency. According to
its bankruptcy filings, Detroit already has sought to reduce expenses
through measures such as employee headcount reductions.205 These
cuts have ‘‘gutted many City departments, resulting in the deferral of
many necessary investments and decreasing level of services to
Detroiters,’’ according to Emergency Manager Orr.206 They also have
contributed to a negative feedback loop in Detroit whereby taxes on

198. SEC, supra note 109, at 24---25 (citations omitted).
199. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 14 (2013), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/
PCS_Assets/2013/Pew_State_Role_in_Local_Government_Financial_Distress.pdf.
200. Id. at 16.
201. Id. at 14.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Battle Creek Becomes Second Michigan
Municipality to Delay Bond Aale, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20130806/NEWS01/130819889/battle-creekbecomes-second-michigan-municipality-to-delay-bond-sale.
205. Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 46.
206. Id. at 22.
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those who must remain are unsustainable, even as the City’s
inadequate public infrastructure and services and high tax rates
threaten to drive people and business away.
II. KEY LEGAL QUESTIONS: PENSIONER RIGHTS, BONDHOLDER
RIGHTS, AND TAXPAYER RIGHTS
Against this backdrop of hard choices and competition for meager
resources, Detroit’s bankruptcy presents two key legal questions: 1)
Can Detroit use Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings to reduce or
restructure accrued pension benefits of retired city workers when the
Michigan Constitution states that ‘‘[t]he accrued financial benefits of
each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political
subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not
be diminished or impaired thereby’’207 and also states that
‘‘[n]o . . . law impairing the obligations of contract shall be
enacted?’’208 2) How will debts associated with Detroit’s municipal
securities------and particularly its UTGO------be dealt with, when (i)
Detroit is already levying taxes at or near statutory maximums; (ii)
City residents cannot absorb taxes increases, and (ii) Detroit does not
have (and will not have, without restructuring) sufficient funds to pay
its debts?
In the following subpart, I discuss legal questions surrounding
pension impairment in Part A, and issues relating to Detroit’s UTGO
bonds in Part B.
A. Can Detroit Use Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Proceedings to
Reduce or Restructure Accrued Pension Rights of Retired City
Workers, Given Michigan Constitution Pension Clause?
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes held that Detroit is
eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor despite the fact that neither the City
nor the State explicitly carved out accrued pension benefits and
protected them from adjustment.209 Judge Rhodes also held that
accrued pension benefits are subject to impairment in Chapter 9
proceedings, despite the Pension Clause.210 In the following section, I
discuss the debate surrounding pension impairment and Judge
Rhodes’s ruling.

207.
208.
209.
210.

MICH. CONST., art IX, § 24.
MICH. CONST., art I, § 10.
See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1.

Id.
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The Emergency Manager Puts Pension Impairment on the Table.

Pension impairment has been a hot button issue in the Detroit
bankruptcy ever since June 14, 2013, when the Office of the
Emergency Manager published a proposal to the City’s creditors
which referenced adjusting pension obligations.211 In his proposal,
Orr outlined Detroit’s dire financial condition and called for a
‘‘thorough overhaul and restructuring’’ of the City’s obligations.212
Among other initiatives, the June 14 proposal outlined the City’s
plans to invest $1.25 billion over ten years to improve basic and
essential City services such as police, fire and EMS.213 The June 14
proposal also outlined the City’s intention to expand its income and
property tax bases, rationalize and adjust income tax rates, and
improve tax and fee collection efforts.214
With respect to creditor recoveries, Orr proposed the following: (i)
‘‘treatment of secured debt commensurate with the value of the
collateral securing such debt, including the repayment or refinancing
of the City’s revenue bonds, secured unlimited and limited tax general
obligation bonds, secured installment notes and liabilities arising in
connection with swap obligations;’’215 (ii) ‘‘pro rata distribution of
$2,000,000,000 in principal amount of interest-only limited recourse
participation notes to holders of unsecured claims,’’ including holders
of unsecured limited and unlimited tax general obligation bonds, the
service corporations (based on the COPs), the pension systems (based
on pension underfunding), and retirees (based on OPEB);216 and (iii)
‘‘[a] ‘Dutch Auction’ process for the City to purchase the notes.’’217
Also at the meeting respecting the June 14 proposal, Orr announced
his decision to not make the scheduled $39,700,000 in payments due
on the COPs and swap transactions.218
With respect to claims for unfunded pension liabilities, Orr stated
that ‘‘[b]ecause the amounts realized on the underfunding claims will
be substantially less than the underfunding amount, there must be

211. See id. at 18; see also OFFICE OF CITY MANAGER, supra note 124; PROPOSAL
supra note 3.
212. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 18; see also OFFICE OF CITY
MANAGER, supra note 124; PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3.
213. See PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 61---78 app. J.
214. Id. at 79---82.
215. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 18 (citing PROPOSAL FOR
CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 101---09).
216. Id. at 19 (citing PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 101---09).
217. Id. (citing PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 108).
218. See id.

FOR CREDITORS,
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significant cuts in accrued, vested pension amounts for both active
and currently retired persons.’’219 In subsequent comments, Orr
acknowledged the Pension Clause of the Michigan Constitution, but
reportedly suggested that neither it nor the Contracts Clause
prevented a bankruptcy court from impairing pensions as part of a
plan of adjustment under Chapter 9.220

2.

Retirees Initially Seek Refuge in State Court

On July 3, 2013, with the possibility of impairment on the table,
petitioners filed two separate lawsuits in state court seeking a
declaratory judgment that Public Act 436 (the Act pursuant to which
Orr was appointed) violated the Michigan Constitution to the extent
that it purported to authorize Chapter 9 proceedings without first
carving out (or otherwise ring-fencing) accrued pension benefits to
protect them from adjustment.221 The petitioners also sought an
injunction preventing defendants from authorizing any Chapter 9
proceeding in which vested pension benefits might be impaired.222
Shortly thereafter, the Detroit pensions systems filed a similar
lawsuit.223
On July 18, 2013, the Ingham County Circuit Court found that
Chapter 9 for Detroit would impair accrued financial benefits in
violation of the Pension Clause.224 The court entered a preliminary
injunction enjoining officials from taking further action on behalf of
the City through a Chapter 9 proceeding where pension benefits
might be impaired.225 One day later, the court issued a declaratory
judgment order holding that accrued pension benefits could not be
impaired under the Michigan Constitution, and also made the

219. OFFICE OF CITY MANAGER, supra note 124, at 56; see also PROPOSAL FOR
CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 109.
220. See, e.g., Q & A with Kevyn Orr: Detroit’s Emergency Manager Talks About
City’s Future, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 16, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/
20130616/OPINION05/306160052/kevyn-orr-detroit-emergency-manager-creditorsfiscal-crisis; Ed White, Detroit to Get Crucial Ruling in Bankruptcy Case, YAHOO!
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/detroit-crucial-ruling-bankruptcy-case061034373------finance.html.
221. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Flowers v. Snyder, No. 13-729-CZ (Mich. Cir.
Ct. July 8, 2013); Complaint, Webster v. Michigan, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
3, 2013).
222. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 221.
223. Complaint, Gen. Retirement Syst. of the City of Detroit v. Orr, No. 13-768CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 17, 2013).
224. Preliminary Injunction, Webster v. State, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
18, 2013).
225. Id.
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following rulings: (i) ‘‘PA 436 is unconstitutional and in violation
of . . . [the Pension Clause,] to the extent it permits the Governor to
authorize an emergency manager to proceed under Chapter 9 in any
manner which threatens to impair or diminish accrued pension
benefits;’’ (ii) ‘‘[t]he Governor is prohibited by . . . [the Pension
Clause] from authorizing an emergency manager under PA 436 to
proceed under Chapter 9 in a manner which threatens to diminish or
impair accrued pension benefits;’’ and (iii) ‘‘[b]y authorizing []
Emergency Manager [Orr] to proceed under Chapter 9 to diminish or
impair accrued pension benefits, [the Governor] acted without
authority under Michigan law and in violation of . . . [the Pension
Clause].226

3.

The Debate Moves to Bankruptcy Court

This City’s bankruptcy filing moved the debate to bankruptcy
court. On July 16, 2013, Emergency Manager Orr recommended to
Michigan governor Richard Snyder and to the state’s treasurer that
the City file for Chapter 9 relief.227 On July 18, the same day the state
court issued its judgment, Governor Snyder authorized the City to file
a Chapter 9 petition.228 Although section 141.15661(1) of the
Michigan Compiled Laws purports to permit the governor to ‘‘place
contingencies on a local government in order to proceed under
chapter 9,’’229 Governor Snyder did not do so. Instead, Governor
Snyder explained that he was ‘‘choosing not to impose any such
contingencies today. Federal law already contains the most important
contingency------a requirement that the plan be legally executable.’’230

226. See Order of Declaratory Judgment, Webster v. State, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich.
Cir. Ct. July 19, 2013).
227. See Letter from Kevin D. Orr, Emergency Manager, City of Detroit, Mich., to
Richard Snyder, Governor, State of Mich. & Andrew Dillon, Treasurer, State of
Mich. (July 16, 2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit J).
228. Letter from Richard D. Snyder, Governor, State of Mich. to Kevyn Orr, City
Manager, City of Detroit, Mich. & Andrew Dillon, State Treasurer, State of Mich.
(July 18, 2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit K) (citation
omitted).
229. MICH. COMP. LAW § 141.1558(1) (2013); see Letter from Richard D. Snyder,
Governor, State of Mich. to Kevyn Orr, City Manager, City of Detroit, Mich. &
Andrew Dillon, State Treasurer, State of Mich. 4 (July 18, 2013), in Orr Declaration,
supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit K).
230. Letter from Richard D. Snyder, Governor, State of Mich. to Kevyn Orr, City
Manager, City of Detroit, Mich. & Andrew Dillon, State Treasurer, State of Mich. 4
(July 18, 2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit K).
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Orr filed the City’s Chapter 9 petition that same day.231 After the
bankruptcy court entered an order staying pre-petition litigation
(including the state court actions), more than one hundred parties
(including pensioners and other stakeholders) (hereinafter,
collectively, the Objectors) filed objections to Detroit’s eligibility in
the bankruptcy court action.232
Citing the Pension Clause, public worker stakeholders argued that
Detroit is not eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor because the State (and
the City) failed explicitly to protect accrued pension benefits from
impairment.233 Among other arguments, these Objectors asserted
that (i) Chapter 9 is unconstitutional on its face under the Bankruptcy
Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
because it violates the uniformity requirement, and under the
Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10 to the extent it would permit
the impairment of contracts to which the state is a party; and (ii)
Chapter 9 is unconstitutional as applied under the Tenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution to the extent it does not prohibit the
bankruptcy court from impairing vested pension benefits owed to
Detroit’s retired city workers.234

231. See Bankruptcy Petition, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013).
232. Order Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code Confirming the
Protections of Sections 362, 365 and 922 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re City of
Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 25, 2013);
see Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that 109 parties filed
timely objections). As to federalism issues associated with the state court rulings,
Judge Rhodes held that the Ingham County court’s judgment respecting was not
binding under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and also is not a
persuasive indication of what the Michigan Supreme Court would hold. See id. at
55---56.
233. See, e.g., Objection of the Official Committee of Retirees to Eligibility of the
City of Detroit, Michigan to Be A Debtor Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,
In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug.
19, 2013).
234. Id. As summarized by the bankruptcy court, 110 separate creditors filed
objections to Detroit’s eligibility on various grounds, raising the following legal
questions:
1. Does chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code violate the uniformity
requirement of the bankruptcy clause of the United States Constitution?[;]
2. Does chapter 9 violate the contracts clause of the United States
Constitution?[;] 3. Does chapter 9 violate the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as applied in this case?[;] 4. Does the
bankruptcy court have the authority to determine the constitutionality of
chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code under Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594
(2011)?[;] 5. Did the voters’ rejection of Michigan Public Act 4 of 2011 in
November 2012 constitutionally prohibit the Michigan Legislature from
enacting Michigan Public Act 436 of 2012?[;] 6. Does Public Act 436 violate
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Judge Rhodes’s Opinion Regarding Eligibility

On December 5, 2013, following extensive briefing and hearings,
Judge Rhodes issued a 143-page ruling respecting Detroit’s eligibility
for Chapter 9 relief.235 After cataloging Detroit’s debts and the
impact of the City’s financial crisis on the City’s beleaguered
residents, Judge Rhodes observed that a plan of adjustment may be
Detroit’s only hope for survival:
The City of Detroit was once a hardworking, diverse, vital city,
the home of the automobile industry, proud of its nickname------the
‘‘Motor City.’’ It was rightfully known as the birthplace of the
American automobile industry. In 1952, at the height of its
prosperity and prestige, it had a population of approximately
1,850,000 residents. In 1950, Detroit was building half of the world’s
cars.
The evidence before the Court establishes that for decades,
however, the City of Detroit has experienced dwindling population,
employment, and revenues. This has led to decaying infrastructure,

the Michigan Constitution because it included appropriations provisions for
the purpose of evading the right of referendum?[;] 7. Does Public Act 436
violate the home rule provisions of the Michigan Constitution?[;] 8. Does
Public Act 436 violate the pension clause of the Michigan Constitution?[;] 9.
Does the pension clause of the Michigan Constitution establish protections
for pension rights that are greater than contract rights?[;] 10. Does the
bankruptcy court have the authority to determine the constitutionality of
Public Act 436 under Stern v. Marshall?[;] 11. Did Detroit’s emergency
manager have valid authority to file this bankruptcy case even though he is
not an elected official?[;] 12. Was the governor’s authorization to file this
bankruptcy case valid under the Michigan Constitution even though the
authorization did not prohibit the City from impairing pension rights?[;] 13.
Does the judgment in Webster v. Michigan, which was entered postpetition, preclude the City from asserting that the governor’s authorization
to file this bankruptcy case was valid?[;] 14. Was the City ‘‘insolvent’’ under
11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C), as required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3)?[;] 15. Does the
City desire to effect a plan to adjust its debts, as required by 11 U.S.C. §
109(c)(4)?[;] 16. Did the City negotiate with its creditors in good faith
before filing its bankruptcy petition, as required (in the alternative) by 11
U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B)?[;] 17. Was the City unable to negotiate with creditors
because such negotiation was impracticable, as required (in the alternative)
by 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(C)?[; and] 18. Should the case be dismissed under
11 U.S.C. § 921(c) because the City of Detroit did not file its bankruptcy
petition in good faith?
Memorandum Regarding: I. Certification Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) II.
Recommendation on Whether Direct Appeals Should Be Authorized And III.
Parties’ Request to Recommend Expedited Consideration of Appeals at 6---7, In re
City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 20,
2013).
235. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1.
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excessive borrowing, mounting crime rates, spreading blight, and a
deteriorating quality of life.
The City no longer has the resources to provide its residents with
the basic police, fire and emergency medical services that its
residents need for their basic health and safety.
Moreover, the City’s governmental operations are wasteful and
inefficient. Its equipment, especially its streetlights and its
technology, and much of its fire and police equipment, is obsolete.
To reverse this decline in basic services, to attract new residents and
businesses, and to revitalize and reinvigorate itself, the City needs
help.236

Having framed the case in this fashion, Judge Rhodes held that
Detroit meets the criteria set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) and is eligible
to be a Chapter 9 debtor.237 With respect to pension impairment,
Judge Rhodes rejected the Objectors’ claim that the City was
required to carve out pensions as a condition to Chapter 9
eligibility.238
Among other specific holdings239 Judge Rhodes

236. Id. at 4. Notably, during hearings on the Objections to Eligibility, Judge
Rhodes said (with respect to the Pensions Clause),
The question we all are struggling with is what is the meaning------the
substantive meaning------of that provision in the context of a political
subdivision that doesn’t have the money to comply with it? What’s the
meaning of it? How do we give meaning to non-impairment . . . if the city
doesn’t have the money to pay?
Hearing on Eligibility Objections at 41:19, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846,
2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 15-16, 2013), available at
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/apps/detroit/DetroitAudio.cfm. Judge Rhodes raised
this theme repeatedly during arguments, questioning lawyer after lawyer about what
the Pension Clause guarantee means if Detroit does not have the money to meet its
pension-related obligations in full, or if meeting those obligations in full (were it even
possible) would mean the City was unable to make the kind of investments in
infrastructure, services and the living conditions generally necessary to put the City
on a path towards recovery. See, e.g., id. at 2:45:47---2:48:00.
237. See generally Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1.
238. Id. at 41---44.
239. Id. Other holdings not discussed in this Article include the following: (a) the
bankruptcy court has the authority to determine the constitutionality of Chapter 9
and Michigan Public Act 436, see id. at 22---26; (b) Michigan Public Act 436 does not
violate the Michigan Constitution, see id. at 45---52; (c) Detroit’s Emergency Manager
had valid authority to file the bankruptcy case even though he is not an elected
official, see id. at 52; (d) the Governor’s authorization to file the bankruptcy case was
valid under the Michigan Constitution even though the authorization did not prohibit
the City from impairing pension rights, see id. at 52---53; (e) the judgment in the
Webster state court action does not preclude the City from asserting that the
Governor’s authorization to file the bankruptcy case was valid, see id. at 53---59; (f)
Detroit was insolvent, see id. at 59---62; (g) the City desires to effect a plan to adjust its
debts, see id. at 62---64; (g) the City did not negotiate in good faith with creditors, see
id. at 64---68; (h) the City filed its bankruptcy petition in good faith, see id. at 71---81;
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concluded that (a) Chapter 9 is not facially unconstitutional under the
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, Section 8 or the Contracts Clause of
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution;240 (b) Chapter
9 does not violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution;241 and (c) Chapter 9 is constitutional as applied in this
case despite the failure to ring-fence pensions.242 The following
section discusses the parties’ arguments, and the court’s rulings, on
the pension impairment issue.

a.

Objectors Have Standing, Dispute Is Ripe For Adjudication243

As a preliminary matter, Judge Rhodes rejected claims that the
Objectors lacked standing, and that their claims were not yet ripe for
adjudication.244 In pre-hearing papers, the United States and the City
argued that the Objectors’ claims respecting pension impairment
ought to be addressed at the plan confirmation state (and only then if
the City proposed a plan of adjustment calling for impairment)
because only then would the court know if (and how) the City sought
to impair accrued pension benefits.245 Citing the Pension Clause, the
Emergency Manager’s June 14 proposal and statements regarding
court’s power to impair pension rights, the Governor’s authorization,
and the City’s petition, the Objectors argued that that they had
standing, and that their dispute was ripe for adjudication, on the
theory that filing a petition without ring-fencing pension was itself an
impairment, and an injury in fact. 246

and (i) the Supreme Court’s decision in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection does not apply in this case. 474 U.S. 494
(1986); see id. at 82.
240. Id. at 28.
241. Id. at 28---29, 32---44.
242. Id. at 40---44.
243. Although the court addressed standing and ripeness in the context of his
Tenth Amendment analysis ‘‘because the United States and the City framed this issue
in the context of the Tenth Amendment challenge to chapter 9 of the bankruptcy
code,’’ the court observed that ‘‘the same considerations would apply and would lead
to the same conclusion’’ to the extent that standing and ripeness arguments were
made respecting the other constitutional challenges presented by Objectors’ papers.
Id. at 29 n.19. Consequently, I have addressed standing and ripeness first, and they
are typically threshold issues.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., United States of America’s Memorandum in Support of
Constitutionality of Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the United States Code at 16---18, In re
City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 11,
2013); see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 29---32.
246. See, e.g., The Michigan Council 25 of the American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO and Sub-Chapter 98, City of Detroit
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In his Opinion Regarding Eligibility, Judge Rhodes found in favor
of Objectors as to both standing and ripeness. With respect to
standing, Judge Rhodes held that the Objectors ‘‘who are creditors
with pension claims against the City’’ are parties in interest, and thus
have standing to assert their constitutional arguments as part of the
bankruptcy case.247 With respect to ripeness, the court held that the
Objectors’ challenge to Detroit’s eligibility is not an ‘‘abstract
disagreement ungrounded in the here and now.’’248 Rather, the
dispute ‘‘arises in the concrete factual context of the City of Detroit
filing this bankruptcy case under chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code
and the objecting parties challenging the constitutionality of that very
law.’’249 In so holding, Judge Rhodes rejected arguments that the
Objectors’ injury was not yet ‘‘imminent’’ because the city had not yet
filed a plan of adjustment outlining the precise contours of
impairment.250
Notably, Judge Rhodes cited ‘‘judicial prudence’’ and a desire to
expedite proceedings as additional support for his rulings respecting
ripeness and standing. 251 Judge Rhodes has made it clear throughout
these proceedings that he is anxious for the City’s stakeholders to
come together, if possible, to chart a course forward for the City: for
example, Judge Rhodes has directed parties to mediation, stating
‘‘years of litigation, disputing issues in the courts,’’ would be
‘‘horrendous’’ for the City.252 In the Opinion Regarding Eligibility,
Judge Rhodes reasoned that addressing constitutional issues

Retirees’ Objection to the City of Detroit’s Eligibility to Obtain Relief Under
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code at 33---38, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 1353846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter AFSCME
Objection to Eligibility]; see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 29--32.
247. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 30.
248. See id. at 31 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 30---32.
251. Id. at 31.
252. See, e.g., Detroit Attempts to Reach Bankruptcy Settlement in Mediation
with Creditors, GUARDIAN (Sep. 17, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/sep/17/detroit-bankruptcy-settlement-creditors. Since issuing his opinion
regarding eligibility, Judge Rhodes has continued to direct litigants to mediation; See
also Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued Mediation On DWSD
Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Dec. 31, 2013); Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued Mediation
on UTGO Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2103); Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued
Mediation on LTGO Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2103).
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surrounding the Pension Clause at the eligibility stage (rather than
waiting until the City presents a plan for confirmation) would permit
the court and the parties to focus on whether the City’s ultimate plan
meets the confirmation requirements of the bankruptcy code.253
While the court might have postponed consideration on ripeness
grounds in particular, addressing the relationship between Chapter 9
and the Michigan Constitution at the eligibility likely will influence
the parties’ willingness (and ability) to negotiate respecting an
adjustment plan: after all, if the court had held that accrued pension
benefits were off the table entirely, public workers would have little
incentive to negotiate and/or compromise. The court’s early ruling on
impairment is thus consistent with Judge Rhodes’ efforts to bring the
parties to the table to forge a compromise.
B.

1.

Chapter 9 Is Not Facially Unconstitutional

Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Uniformity Clause or the
Contracts Clause

In pre-hearing papers, certain of the Objectors (principally the
union AFSCME) argued that Chapter 9 is unconstitutional on its face
because it ‘‘ced[es] to each state the ability to define its own
qualifications for a municipality to declare bankruptcy’’ and thus
permits the ‘‘promulgation of non-uniform bankruptcies.’’254 The
potential for non-uniformity is particularly acute in states like
Michigan, according to AFSCME, because Michigan law (i.e., Public
Act 436) allows the governor to attach contingencies to authorization
for a Chapter 9 petition.255
For its part, the City argued that the uniformity rule prevents
Michigan from conditioning Detroit’s entry into bankruptcy on a
promise to ring-fence pensions. The City argued that Chapter 9’s
framework was ‘‘well established’’ when Michigan’s Pension Clause
was ratified in 1963: then, as now, it establishes criteria for eligibility,
allows states to decide whether municipalities may seek Chapter 9
relief, and authorizes the bankruptcy court to impair contracts to
which a debtor municipality is a party as part of a plan of
adjustment.256 The City argued that the Pension Clause, which was
enacted after the Chapter 9 regime was in place, is consistent with the

253.
254.
255.
256.

See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 31.
See id. at 26 (citing AFSCME Objection to Eligibility, supra note 246).
Id. (citing AFSCME Objection to Eligibility, supra note 246).
See id.
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Chapter 9 regime, in that it ‘‘does not include any restrictions on the
authorization or filing of municipal bankruptcy,’’ nor does it prevent
the bankruptcy court from adjusting accrued pension-related debt. 257
The City also argued that even if the Pension Clause could be
interpreted to condition Detroit’s access to Chapter 9 relief on ringfencing, or to limit Detroit’s ability to use Chapter 9 to adjust debts,
any such limits would prohibited and preempted under federal law.258
The City argued that under the uniformity requirement and the
Supremacy Clause,259 Congress’ power to enact a comprehensive
federal scheme for bankruptcies ‘‘displaces any contrary state-law
provisions that purport to alter or impair a debtor’s powers under the
Bankruptcy Code.’’260 The City argued that while Michigan has the
authority to decide whether to permit its municipalities to seek
protection under Chapter 9, having chosen to permit Chapter 9
filings, it does not have the authority to ‘‘override’’ the uniform
scheme of federal bankruptcy through state laws which would limit or
condition the tools of debt adjustment available to municipalities
once in bankruptcy.261

257. See City of Detroit’s Consolidated Reply to Objections to the Entry of an
Order for Relief at 25, In re City of Detroit, Mich. No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013). As authority, the City’s pre-hearing papers cite
several cases which held that municipalities were eligible to be Chapter 9 debtors,
even though pensions were potentially vulnerable to impairment in bankruptcy, as
well as an Alabama case where, reportedly, ‘‘chapter 9 has not only been authorized
but, consistent with constitutional protections for contracts, has also been used to
reduce pensions.’’ Id. at 27 (citing In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 222 (Bankr. E.D.
Ca. 2013); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of
Vallejo), 408 B.R. 280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009); In re City of Prichard at 6---7, No. 9913465 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2000) (Dkt. No. 123) (order confirming plan of
adjustment reducing all existing and future pension benefits payments by 8.5%)).
258. See id. at 29---31.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 30 (citing In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012)).
261. Id.; see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76---77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009);
aff’d sub nom. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of
Vallejo), 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (‘‘Incorporating state substantive law into
chapter 9 to amend, modify or negate substantive provisions of chapter 9 would
violate Congress’ ability to enact uniform bankruptcy laws.’’); Stockton, 478 B.R. at
16 (‘‘A state cannot . . . condition or . . . qualify, i.e., to ‘cherry pick,’ the application
of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply in chapter 9 cases after such a case has
been filed.’’); Cnty. Of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191
B.R. 1005, 1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding (1) Chapter 9 sets priorities among
creditors such that state statute setting priority could be preempted by federal law;
and (2) deviating from federal scheme would ‘‘violate the constitutional mandate for
uniform bankruptcy laws’’ by determining creditor priorities based on factors that
vary from state to state).
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In rejecting the Objectors’ uniformity requirement challenge,
Judge Rhodes held that Chapter 9 does exactly what the uniformity
requirement mandates ------ namely, it applies uniformly to all Chapter
9 debtors.262 Here, the relevant class of debtors is the universe of
municipal entities that meets the eligibility requirements of Section
109(c) of the bankruptcy code.263 As Judge Rhodes recognized, one
such qualification is that the entity is ‘‘specifically authorized . . . to be
a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental
officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such
entity to be a debtor under such chapter.’’’264 Citing Stellwagen v.
Clum,265 Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses,266 and Schultz v. United
States,267 Judge Rhodes held that as long as the specifically authorized
requirement is applied to the class of eligible debtors, ‘‘it is of no
consequence in the uniformity analysis that this requirement of state
authorization to file a chapter 9 case may lead to different results in
different states.’’268
The Court dealt more harshly with the Objectors’ argument that
Chapter 9 is unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause, deeming it
‘‘frivolous.’’269 Noting that Chapter 9 is a federal law, Judge Rhodes
held that the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution (which
provides, ‘‘No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .’’) does not prohibit Congress from
enacting a law impairing the obligation of contracts.270 Quoting In re
City of Stockton,271 Judge Rhodes found that ‘‘[t]he Bankruptcy
Clause necessarily authorizes Congress to make laws that would
impair contracts. It has long been understood that bankruptcy law
entails impairment of contracts.’’ 272 Because contract impairment is
at the heart of any bankruptcy proceeding, Judge Rhodes rejected the

262. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 27.
263. Id.
264. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012)).
265. 245 U.S. 605 (1918).
266. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
267. 529 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2008).
268. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 27.
269. Id. at 28. The Contracts Clause, which is Article I, Section 10 of the United
States Constitution provides, ‘‘No State shall . . . . pass any . . . Law Impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .’’ U.S. CONST. art. I § 10. The Objectors had argued that
Chapter 9 violates the Contracts Clause because it permits the impairment of
contracts. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 26.
270. Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. article I, § 10, cl. 1.
271. 478 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
272. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 40 (citing In re City of
Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012)).
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idea that the Contracts Clause makes Chapter 9 unconstitutional on
its face.
Although the role of state choice figures more centrally in Judge
Rhodes’’’ as applied’’ analysis under the Tenth Amendment
(discussed below), it is worth noting that other courts have cited the
constitutional imperative for uniformity in rejecting the idea that
states can pick and choose how Chapter 9 will apply------particularly
with regard to priorities. For example, in the Orange County
bankruptcy, the court held that California was not at liberty to
determine absolutely debtors’ property interests/rights through state
law, having consented to the availability of Chapter 9 relief for
eligible debtors:
If chapter 9 permitted states to define all properties of the debtor
in bankruptcy regardless of the situation and to rewrite bankruptcy
priorities, then chapter 9 would become a balkanized landscape of
questionable value. Moreover, chapter 9 would violate the
constitutional mandate for uniform bankruptcy laws.
Reserving to bankruptcy law the setting of priorities in chapter 9
does not unnecessarily impinge on states’ rights or the ability of a
municipal debtor to provide important services to the public. Nor
does this principle conflict with Code § 903, which reserves to the
state the power to control the municipal debtor in the exercise of its
political or governmental powers.
Furthermore, pursuant to Code § 109(c)(2), a municipal debtor
must be specifically authorized by state law to file a chapter 9 . . . By
authorizing the use of chapter 9 by its municipalities, California
must accept chapter 9 in its totality; it cannot cherry pick what it
likes while disregarding the rest. The right to discharge is not a
benefit without burdens.
As the court in In re City of Columbia Falls, Montana, Special
Improvement Dist., No. 25, 143 B.R. 750, 759 (Bankr.D.Mont.1992),
held in approving a chapter 9 plan of adjustment where the plan did
not pay prepetition bondholders the full amount of their claim with
interest in contravention of state law, ‘‘to create a federal statute
based upon a theory that federal intervention was necessary to
permit adjustment of a municipality’s debts and then to prohibit the
municipality from adjusting such debts is not, in the point of the
view of this Court, a logical or necessary result.273

273. See In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1020---21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 24,
1996) (citations omitted); see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76---77 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub nom., Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of
Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (‘‘Incorporating state
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This line of cases suggests that having consented to Chapter 9 relief
for eligible debtors, Michigan may not limit Detroit’s access to
Chapter 9, or to the tools of adjustment available in Chapter 9,
without running afoul of the uniformity requirement and supremacy
rules.

2.

Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Tenth Amendment.

Several of the Objectors also argued that Chapter 9 is facially
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because it unduly
impinges upon state sovereignty.274 Judge Rhodes rejected this
argument as well. Citing the seminal United States v. Bekins case,
Judge Rhodes held that ‘‘[t]he question of whether a federal
municipal bankruptcy act can be administered consistent with the
principles of federalism reflected in the Tenth Amendment has
already been decided’’ by the Supreme Court in Bekins-----affirmatively.275 In Bekins, ‘‘the Supreme Court specifically upheld
the constitutionality of the Municipal Corporation Bankruptcy Act,
50 Stat. 653 (1937), over objections that the statute violated the Tenth
Amendment.’’276 Considering Bekins and its progeny, Judge Rhodes
held that Bekins remains good authority and reasoned that the states’
ability to consent (or not) to the availability of Chapter 9 relief for
their municipalities is key to Bekins continued force.277 Judge Rhodes
observed that, ‘‘[i]f the state is acting voluntarily, it is free to engage
with the federal government across a broad range of subject areas.
The Tenth Amendment is violated only when the state does not
consent.’’278 So, while the federal government cannot (and does not
through Chapter 9) compel states to authorize municipalities to file
for Chapter 9 relief, and while municipalities are not free to seek
Chapter 9 relief without state authorization (in recognition of state
sovereignty), states can decide to engage with the federal government
by authorizing municipal bankruptcy for political subdivision under
Chapter 9 without running afoul of federalism and state sovereignty
principles embodied in the Tenth Amendment.279
substantive law into chapter 9 to amend, modify or negate substantive provisions of
chapter 9 would violate Congress’ ability to enact uniform bankruptcy laws.’’).
274. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 28---29; AFSCME
Objection to Eligibility, supra note 246, at 15---16.
275. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 32.
276. Id. (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 53---54 (1938)).
277. Id. at 32---38.
278. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 37.
279. Id. at 37---38. In so holding, Judge Rhodes read Faitoutie Iron & Steel Co. v.
City of Asbury Park, New Jersey, 316 U.S. 502, (1942) as limited to its own facts. Id.
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Chapter 9 Is Constitutional ‘‘As Applied’’

State choice also played a key role in Judge Rhodes’ analysis of the
‘‘as applied’’ challenge to Chapter 9. Several of the Objectors argued
that Chapter 9 is unconstitutional as applied to the extent it would
permit Michigan to authorize one of its political subdivisions to file
for bankruptcy without explicitly ring-fencing or otherwise explicitly
protecting vested pension benefits, given that neither Michigan nor
Detroit can impair accrued pension benefits under the Pension
Clause.280 In rejecting this challenge, Judge Rhodes found that while
Michigan and Detroit cannot adjust Detroit’s accrued pension-related
obligations, the bankruptcy court is not so constrained.281
Judge Rhodes’ ruling is based on two key holdings. First, as noted
previously, Judge Rhodes found that the bankruptcy code permits,
and in fact anticipates, that the bankruptcy court will impair contracts
as part of any plan of adjustment.282 In fact, debt adjustment is the
raison d’être of bankruptcy, as the court recognized in the City of
Stockton bankruptcy case, in a passage Judge Rhodes quotes:
In other words, while a state cannot make a law impairing the
obligation of contract, Congress can do so. The goal of the
Bankruptcy Code is adjusting the debtor-creditor relationship.
Every discharge impairs contracts. While bankruptcy law endeavors
to provide a system of orderly, predictable rules or treatment of
parties whose contracts are impaired, that does not change the
starring role of contract impairment in bankruptcy.
It follows, then, that contracts may be impaired on this chapter 9
case without offending the Constitution. The Bankruptcy Clause
gives Congress express power to legislate uniform laws of
bankruptcy that result in impairment of contract; and Congress is
not subject to the restriction that the Contracts Clause places on
states.’’ 283

at 34---35. In Asbury Park, a New Jersey state court ‘‘authorized’’ an adjustment plan,
making certain bonds significantly more valuable. 316 U.S. at 507---08, 512---13.
Although the Supreme Court sustained this alternation of a municipal bond contract,
it was careful to state that its holding did ‘‘not go beyond the case before’’ it. Id. at
516. Noting that the ‘‘limited application of Asbury Park to its own facts has been
repeatedly recognized,’’ Judge Rhodes held that it is now ‘‘firmly established that the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution bars a state from enacting
municipal bankruptcy legislation.’’ Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 35.
280. Id. at 40.
281. See id. at 40.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 40---41 (citing In re City of Stockton, Cal., 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2012).
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Mindful of the bankruptcy court’s power to impair contracts, Judge
Rhodes held that ‘‘[f]or Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty
purposes, nothing distinguishes pension debt in a municipal
bankruptcy case from any other debt.’’284 Under Bekins, so long as
the state consents to Chapter 9, a bankruptcy court may adjust
municipal debts (including pension debts) as part of a larger plan of
adjust without infringing on state sovereignty------even if the debt
implicates rights or property interests that otherwise protected by the
state constitution, and even if the State could not so act.285
Second, Judge Rhodes found, after a lengthy review of precedent
and legislative history, that pension rights are a contractual obligation
under the Michigan Constitution, and thus subject to adjustment in a
Chapter 9 proceeding along with other contract debts.286 Judge
Rhodes based this holding on (a) the language of the Michigan
Constitution, which states that pension rights are a ‘‘contractual
obligation,’’ (b) Michigan case law, including Kosa v. State Treasurer
of Michigan,287 and In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding
Constitutionality of 2011 Pa. 38;288 and (c) the legislative history of the
Pension Clause as recounted in Kosa.289
With respect to legislative history, Judge Rhodes observed that, at
common law, public pensions were treated as ‘‘gratuitous allowances
that could be revoked at will’’ prior to actual distribution as a matter
of contract law.290 The Pension Clause, which was included in the
constitution adopted in Michigan in 1963, speaks to this issue in
contract law terms: it states that ‘‘[t]he accrued financial benefits of
each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political
subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not
284. See id. at 41.
285. Id. at 40---41.
286. Id. at 40---41.
287. 292 N.W.2d 452 (Mich. 1980).
288. 806 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 2011).
289. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 42---44.
290. Id. at 41 (citing Brown v. Highland Park, 30 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich. 1948)
(‘‘We are convinced that the majority of cases in other jurisdictions establishes the
rule that a pension granted by public authorities is not a contractual obligation, that
the pensioner has no vested right, and that a pension is terminable at the will of a
municipality, at least while acting within reasonable limits. At best plaintiffs in this
case have an expectancy based upon continuance of existing charter provisions.’’).
Judge Rhodes also cited Kosa, where the court observed, ‘‘Until the adoption of
Const. 1963, art. 9, § 24, legislative appropriation for retirement fund reserves was
considered to be an ex gratia action. Consequently, the most that could be said about
pre-con legislative appropriations for retirees was that there was some kind of
implied commitment to fund pension reserves.’’ Kosa, 292 N.W.2d at 459 (citation
omitted).
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be diminished or impaired thereby.’’291 In a passage cited by Judge
Rhodes, the Michigan Supreme Court in Kosa referenced the
following discourse from legislative history respecting the Pensions
Clause which suggests that the Pension Clause was intended to give
pensioners a contractual right to accrued pension benefits:
MR. VAN DUSEN: Mr. Chairman, if I may elaborate briefly on
Mr. Brake’s answer to Mr. Downs’ question, I would like to indicate
that the words ‘accrued financial benefits’ were used designedly, so
that the contractual right of the employee would be limited to the
deferred compensation embodied in any pension plan, and that we
hope to avoid thereby a proliferation of litigation by individual
participants in retirement systems talking about the general benefits
structure, or something other than his specific right to receive
benefits. It is not intended that an individual employee should, as a
result of this language, be given the right to sue the employing unit
to require the actuarial funding of past service benefits, or anything
of that nature. What it is designed to do is to say that when his
benefits come due, he’s got a contractual right to receive them. And,
in answer to your second question, he has the contractual right to
sue for them. So that he has no particular interest in the funding of
somebody else’s benefits as long as he has the contractual right to
sue for his.
‘‘MR. DOWNS: I appreciate Mr. Van Dusen’s comments. Again,
I want to see if I understand this. Then he would not have a remedy
of legally forcing the legislative body each year to set aside the
appropriate amount, but when the money did come due this would
be a contractual right for which he could sue a ministerial officer
that could be mandamused or enjoined; is that correct?
‘‘MR. VAN DUSEN: That’s my understanding, Mr. Downs.’’292

In another passage quoted by the Judge Rhodes, the Kosa court
also summarized the Pension Clause using the language of contract:
To sum up, while the Legislature’s constitutional contractual
obligation is not to impair ‘‘accrued financial benefits,’’ even if that
obligation also related to the funding system, there would be no
impairment of the contractual obligation because the substituted
‘‘entry age normal’’ system supports the benefit structure as strongly
as the replaced ‘‘attained age’’ system.293

Based on case law and the cited legislative history, Judge Rhodes
concluded that the Pension Clause treats accrued pension rights as

291. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra at 42 (citing MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24).
292. Id. at 42 (emphasis added) (quoting Kosa, 292 N.W.2d at 459 n.21).
293. Id. at 42 (emphasis added) (citing Kosa, 292 N.W.2d at 461).
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contract rights, and that it does not confer extraordinary protection
beyond that available to contracts generally.294 In so holding, Judge
Rhodes rejected arguments advanced by the Michigan Attorney
General and the Objectors the Michigan Pensions Clause represents
an ‘‘impermeable imperative’’ which prohibits the adjustment of
accrued pension-related debt under any circumstances (save
(presumably) through constitutional reform).295
In addition to Michigan case law and the legislative history, Judge
Rhodes also cited the larger context surrounding the Pension Clause
as grounds for his ruling. Judge Rhodes noted that the Bekins Court
had held that municipal bankruptcy was constitutional by the time the
Pension Clause was adopted.296 With Bekins in place, the Michigan
legislature then elected to allow its political subdivisions to file
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Judge Rhodes reasoned that if the Michigan
legislature had wanted to give accrued pension benefits special
protection against impairment in a Chapter 9 proceeding, it could
have
‘‘prohibited
Michigan
municipalities
from
filing
bankruptcy[,] . . . created a property interest that bankruptcy would
be
required
to
respect
under
Butner
v.
United
States[,]297 . . . established some sort of a secured interest in the
municipality’s property[,] . . . [or] explicitly required the State to
guaranty pension benefits.’’298 But, as Judge Rhodes recognized, the
Michigan legislature ‘‘did none of those.’’299 Instead, it used the
language of contract, and allowed for the possibility of adjustment
though Chapter 9.300 With the Michigan Legislature having failed to
confer extraordinary protections on accrued pension benefits when
the Pension Clause was enacted, Judge Rhodes was not willing to
imply such protections under either Pension Clause or Chapter 9.
Judge Rhodes’ holding is well-grounded in legislative history,
precedent and construction. As Judge Rhodes observed, at common
law, pensions were viewed as ‘‘allowances that could be revoked at
will, because a retiree lacked any vested right in their continuation.’’301

294. Id. at 43.
295. See Attorney General Bill Schuette’s Statement Regarding the Michigan
Constitution & the Bankruptcy of the City of Detroit at 15, In re City of Detroit,
Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013).
296. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 44.
297. 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (holding that property issues in bankruptcy are determined
according to state law).
298. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 44.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 41.
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The legislative history, as interpreted by the Michigan Supreme Court
in Kosa, suggests that accrued pension benefits were accorded the
status of contract rights when the Pension Clause was added to the
Michigan Constitution in 1963 to prevent state officials from revoking
a grant of pension benefits any time prior to distribution.302 In effect,
the Pension Clause makes the promise to provide a pension binding
as a matter of contract law. By using the language of contract, and its
permitting municipalities to file for Chapter 9 protection, the
Michigan legislature did not evince an intent to give accrued pension
benefits the extraordinary protection sought by the Objectors.
D. Cautionary Language, and a Hobson’s Choice for City
Managers
It is important to note that Judge Rhodes was in no way cavalier
about the impact of his decision respecting accrued pension benefits.
To the contrary, he made it clear that he will not confirm a plan of
adjustment that puts the burden of Detroit’s debts unfairly on the
backs of the City’s retired public workers:
[T]he Court is compelled to comment. No one should interpret this
holding that pension rights are subject to impairment in this
bankruptcy case to mean that the Court will necessarily confirm any
plan of adjustment that impairs pensions. The Court emphasizes
that it will not lightly or casually exercise the power under federal
bankruptcy law to impair pensions. Before the Court confirms any
plan that the City Submits, the Court must find that the plan fully
meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 943(b) and the other
applicable provisions of the bankruptcy code. Together, these
provisions of law demand this Court’s judicious legal and equitable
consideration of the interests of the City and all of its creditors, as
well as the laws of the State of Michigan.303

302. Id. at 41---43.
303. Id. at 44. 11 U.S.C. §§ 943(b)(4) and 1129(a)(s) of the Bankruptcy Code
provide that for a plan to be confirmable, it most have been proposed in good faith
and ‘‘not by any means forbidden by law,’’ and that the debtor must not be
‘‘prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan,’’
respectively. In In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist. #7, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska refused to confirm a plan containing a
bondholder discount prohibited by state law as contrary to the requirements of 11
U.S.C. §§ 943(b)(4) and 1129(a)(s) of the Bankruptcy Code. 98 B.R. 970, 973 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1989). Even if the Pensions Clause does not bar impairment in bankruptcy,
the treatment of pension debt in the Michigan Constitution likely will weigh on the
City and Judge Rhodes in drafting, and considering for confirmation, any plan of
adjustment.
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In fact, Judge Rhodes spoke at length about the realities of
Detroit’s insolvency when explaining his ruling, and he urged
stakeholders to address the human costs that insolvency and,
potentially, pension adjustment, will have on retirees and citizens
alike.304 Judge Rhodes recognized that Detroit’s pensioners are
among the City’s most vulnerable stakeholders, and while he has
continued to push for a consensual resolution, he has put all parties
on notice that he will scrutinize any plan of adjustment for
compliance with the letter and intent of the code.305
But if Judge Rhodes recognized the special vulnerability of the
City’s pensioners, he also recognized that the City’s citizens are
vulnerable too, beset by crime, unemployment, poverty, woefully
inadequate services, and years of political corruption.306 In effect,
Judge Rhodes treats Detroit’s residents as another creditor
constituency in his Opinion, owed a debt in the form of at least
minimally acceptable infrastructure and public services. While the
impairment of pension benefits is, obviously, horrible to contemplate,
retirees may receive even less in the future if the city is unable to
adjust its debts and emerge from bankruptcy with a viable recovery
plan in place. Indeed, if Detroit truly is to recover, it needs a plan-----one in which people and businesses return to the City and contribute
tax revenue to the city’s fiscal health, and one in which the City is able
to provide at least basic public services.307 The longer this is not
possible, the less likely it is that pension-holders will, over the long

304. See, e.g., Hearing on Statement Regarding Eligibility Ruling, In re City of
Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2013),
available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/apps/detroit/DetroitAudio.cfm; Opinion
Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 81; see also Hearing on Eligibility Objections,
In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct.
15---16, 2013), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/apps/detroit/Detroit
Audio.cfm.
305. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 81; see also Editorial, For
Detroit’s Retirees, Michigan’s Pension Promise Must Be Kept, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/20130801/OPINION01/308010019/
michigan-constitution-pensions-detroit (‘‘Among the city’s claimants, retirees are the
most vulnerable. Their payouts are meager------an average of $30,000 a year for police
and fire, $19,000 for other city employees------but absolutely crucial to their survival.
And even though the pension systems’ elected leadership mismanaged funds, made
poor investments and overstated the funds’ health, to visit the consequences of those
missteps on recipients is a Dickensian nightmare.’’). Judge Rhodes cited the $18,000
figure in his opinion regarding eligibility. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra
note 1, at 6.
306. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 81.
307. See, e.g. id. at 18---19.
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term, receive anything close to the benefits which they were
promised.
Finally, one wonders whether there was an element of pragmatism
involved in Judge Rhodes’ ruling, along with Constitutional analysis.
(Though, in questioning whether practical realities played a role, I do
not mean to suggest that Judge Rhodes’ ruling is legally suspect. In
fact, I think Judge Rhodes’ ruling on impairment is correct.) Had
Judge Rhodes taken accrued pension benefits off the table entirely at
the eligibility stage, the Objectors might have simply walked away
from mediation and any attempt at a consensual resolution. By
contrast, if impairment is a possibility, the Objectors might have more
incentive and leeway to negotiate. The possibility of pension
impairment almost might spur a political solution------in the form of
state involvement------as well, though that is of course not a certainty
(and, perhaps not even a possibility) at this time. Once the City has
established a sustainable economic model, pension-holders could be
put first in line for additional recoveries if and when the city’s
fortunes improve. And, both the City and its pensioners may have a
strong moral claim on the State to mitigate the real and pain and
suffering that both the City and its pensioners are experiencing as a
result of the City’s financial collapse. But some adjustment (or, at
least the possibility of adjustment) may be necessary as a practical
matter, if Detroit is to have any chance at getting back on its feet.
III. WILL U NLIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION
BONDHOLDERS TAKE A HAIRCUT?
Although not addressed in the Opinion Regarding Eligibility, a
second key issue presented by Detroit’s bankruptcy is whether
unlimited tax general obligation (UTGO) bondholders can and
should be treated as unsecured debt, and thus on par with other
unsecured obligations (including pension-related COP liability), in
the bankruptcy. In his June 14, 2013 proposal for creditors,
Emergency Manager Orr rattled bondholders (and markets) by
categorizing these obligations as unsecured, such that all UTGO
bonds (other than those additionally secured by a state intercept
payment) would be treated on a pari passu basis with all general fund
obligations, then proposing a plan of reorganization that would have
meant a substantial haircut for bondholders.308 Suggestions that the

308. See PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 98 (including in estimate of
unsecured claims UTGO bonds not additionally secured by state interceptor
payments and unsecured pension and OPEB).
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obligation to tax might be limited by tax cap legislation and economic
necessity raised questions about what the ‘‘full faith and credit’’ and
pledge of taxing power means, especially in the case of a deeply
insolvent municipality like Detroit.309
Market reaction to Orr’s characterization was swift, and
unsurprisingly, negative. In a letter to Michigan Governor Snyder,
the industry trade association SIFMA argued that the pledge of
taxing power ought to make UTGO bonds ‘‘first budget obligations’’
backed by an obligation to raise property taxes to levels necessary to
repay principal and interest:
Detroit has issued a number of different types of securities with
different sources of repayment and security, as described in the
offering documents for each transaction. Market expectation is
there would be different treatment for holders of different types of
securities. It is generally the expectation of market participants that
holders of general obligation unlimited tax bonds would be paid
principal and interest as it comes due, based on a pledge of the
debtor’s ‘‘full faith, and credit’’ to repay the bonds, in addition to the
characterization of the bonds as ‘‘first budget obligations, including
the proceeds of annual ad valorem property taxes, which must, to
the extent necessary, be levied on all taxable property.’’ This pledge
is seen by the capital markets to be an obligation to raise property
taxes to the level necessary to pay the principal and interest in the
bonds as they come due. The Michigan Constitution also provides
that repayment of voter approved bonded indebtedness is
guaranteed.310

The SIFMA letter distinguished the city’s obligations with respect
to UTGO bonds from those associated with certificates of
participation which, according to SIMFA, are not backed by a full
faith and credit pledge.311 SIFMA argued that treating the UTGO
bonds on par with unsecured contractual obligations (such as those at
issue in the City’s COPs) would be contrary to offering materials and
would hurt Detroit along with other Michigan municipalities:

309. See id. at 120 app. E (listing $410,830,000 in unlimited tax general obligation
bonds on schedule of unsecured general obligation liabilities as of June 30, 2012).
310. Letter from Ira Hammerman, Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n to
Richard Snyder, Gov., State of Mich. (July 18, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SifmaDetroit.pdf.
311. Id. Instead, offering documents for the certifications of participation
reportedly describe the instruments as unsecured contractual obligations that are
‘‘not general obligations of the City, and neither the faith and credit, taxing power
nor any specific revenues of the City are pledged’’ thereto. Id.
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Any action that would permit general obligation bonds to be treated
on a pari passu basis with unsecured contractual obligations that are
not backed by a full faith and credit pledge ignores the appropriate
priority that should be given to these bonds. We believe that any
such treatment will have a long lasting negative impact on the ability
of Michigan’s municipalities to obtain financing on favorable
terms . . . [M]arket participants may be reluctant to purchase
Michigan general obligation unlimited tax bonds and general
obligation limited tax bonds in the future, causing the cost of
financing infrastructure projects to rise.312

Finally, SIFMA argued that treating UTGO bonds on par with the
City’s outstanding COPs could have a destabilizing effect on the
municipal market as a whole, with Michigan municipalities
particularly at risk.313 Around the same time, Ambac (a bond insurer,
which reportedly is the insurer on several of the UTGO issuances at
issue) released a press release raising many of the same concerns.314
On November 8 and 13, 2013, three monoline insurers of
outstanding bonds issued by Detroit filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment in the bankruptcy, seeking entry of an order declaring that
Detroit must levy, collect, and apply ad valorem taxes for the sole
purpose of paying the principal and interest on unlimited tax bonds
insured by the plaintiffs.315 The complaint alleges that the unlimited
tax bonds at issue are ‘‘[u]nique among the City’s financial
obligations,’’ in that they were issued ‘‘only after resolutions by the
City Council, the legislative body of the City, and approval by a
majority of the voters in a city-wide election establishing a pledge of
ad valorem taxes, as security, to repay these obligations
exclusively.’’316 The complaint further alleges that ‘‘in approving each
bond referendum, [Detroit’s] voters authorized the City to exceed
otherwise applicable maximum rate for ad valorem taxes’’ set forth in

312. Id.
313. See id.
314. See PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at app. E at 120---21 (listing
issuances showing Ambac as insurer); Ambac Comments on Detroit, AMBAC (July 8,
2013), http://ir.ambac.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=775687.
315. See Complaint of Ambac Assurance Corp. for Declaratory Judgment &
Order, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Nov. 8. 2014)
[hereinafter Ambac Complaint]; Complaint of National Public Finance Guarantee
Corp., et. al for Declaratory Judgment & Order, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 1353846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter National Complaint]. For
details regarding the issuances in dispute, see National Complaint, supra, at 5---13, 11--32.
316. Ambac Complaint, supra note 315, at 2; National Complaint, supra note 315,
at 2.

840

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

the Michigan Constitution.317 The plaintiffs argue that Detroit
already had reached the tax rate limitations set forth in the Michigan
Constitution at the time of issuance,318 and that the voters’ approval of
the issuances, coupled with resolutions adopted by Detroit’s City
Council, require Detroit to levy ad valorem taxes in amounts
sufficient to repay bondholders notwithstanding tax rate limitations,
and to collect and apply tax receipts for the sole purpose of meeting
debt service obligations.319
Precedent respecting whether Detroit can use Chapter 9 and/or tax
cap legislation to treat UTGO bonds as unsecured, and on a pari
passu basis with other unsecured obligations, is thin. There is some
authority for the proposition that, under 1988 amendments made to
the Bankruptcy Code, voter-authorized general-obligation debt for
capital projects backed by a specific tax levy that do not feed the
general fund would be considered special-revenue debt, which is
secured. In January 2012, for example, the bankruptcy court in the
Jefferson County bankruptcy case divested a state court-appointed
receiver for the county’s sewer system from possession of the sewer
system, and granted the bondholders the right to reach net sewer
system revenues collected by the county after the filing of the Chapter
9 petition.320 Citing the 1988 amendments to the bankruptcy code, the
court held that, ‘‘[t]he structure and intent of what Congress enacted
by its 1988 amendments to chapter 9 was to provide a mechanism
whereby the pledged special revenues would continue to be paid
uninterrupted to those to which/whom payment of the sewer system’s
indebtedness is secured by a lien on special revenues.’’321 The result,
according to the Alabama court, is that ‘‘11 U.S.C. § 922(d) excludes
continued payment of these pledged special revenues to the
lienholder from being staying under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) or 11 U.S.C. §
922(a).’’322 As to Detroit issuances with similar language, bondholders
may have an argument under the theory adopted by the Alabama
bankruptcy court.
To the extent that Detroit pledged its taxing power without regard
to any constitutional, statutory or charter tax-rate limitations, issues
317. Ambac Complaint, supra note 315, at 3, National Complaint, supra note 315,
at 3.
318. Ambac Complaint, supra note 315, at 3, National Complaint, supra note 315,
at 3.
319. Ambac Complaint, supra note 315, at 13---21; National Complaint, supra note
315, at 3---4, 13---19.
320. See In re Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 474 B.R. 228, 273---74 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
321. Id. at 274.
322. Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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remain knotty. The impact of tax cap legislation on municipal
finances has long been a subject of debate, with some opining that tax
caps have contributed to insolvency in places like Orange County and
Vallejo.323 Moreover, the legal relationship between tax caps and
debt limits on one hand, and a pledge of taxing power on the other,
remains nuanced. In Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that a city
may not contract indebtedness under the New York State
Constitution unless it has, ‘‘pledged its faith and credit for the
payment of the principal thereof and the interest thereon,’’ an
obligation which the court described as both ‘‘a commitment to pay
and a commitment of the city’s revenue generating powers to produce
the funds to pay.’’324 The Flushing Court further held that this regime
‘‘express[es] a constitutional imperative: debt obligations must be
paid even if tax limits be exceeded.’’325 But Flushing is a complicated
case, in no small measure because while the Court declared the
moratorium statute at issue unconstitutional, it nevertheless sought to
facilitate a political/legislative solution.326 Furthermore, the year after
Flushing was decided, the Court of Appeals modified its views
somewhat in Quirk v. Municipal Assistance Corp., holding that only
real property taxes are subject to the prior lien of first revenue.327
Given political and economic consequences, it is perhaps not
surprising other cities facing financial distress (e.g., Vallejo, Central
Falls, Rhode Island328 and Harrisburg) reportedly worked with

323. See James E. Spiotto, Municipal Finance and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, MUN.
FIN. J., no. 1, 1996, at 3 (‘‘The investment losses suffered by Orange County are best
attributed to the disparate efforts of a revenue-starved municipality that had faced
shrinking revenues and expanding costs because of a constitutionally imposed tax cap
(Proposition 13). The difficulty with an artificial and unrealistic tax cap and similar
constitutional limits on taxation is that there are certain municipal services that are
required and expected by the citizens. If revenues available to municipalities are
capped in an unrealistic and artificial way, the ability of municipalities to supply those
necessary services is significantly curtailed.’’). For an early analysis of the impact of
Proposition 13, see FED. RESERVE BANK OF S. F. ECON. REV., PROPOSITION 13 AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 5---6 (1979). For additional commentary on impact of tax caps
and other similar restraints, see MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., supra note 96, at 3.
324. 358 N.E.2d 848, 851 (N.Y. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2) (holding that faith and credit pledge is a prior lien on
revenues of issuer).
325. Id. at 852.
326. Id. at 855.
327. 363 N.E.2d 549, 551 (N.Y. 1977).
328. See, e.g., Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/centralfalls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html (noting that bondholders were paid through
tax increases and deep cuts to pensions and other employee benefits). Notably, ‘‘[i]n
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creditors to ensure that bondholders get paid rather than litigate
through to a decision.
In Detroit’s case, while Judge Rhodes has not yet considered
bondholder claims, these debts would appear to be contractual in
nature, and thus potentially subject to adjustment notwithstanding
pledges of taxing power. As between bondholders, the precise
language requirements of individual issuances may be important.
UTGO bondholders who can make arguments under the theory
adopted in the Jefferson County case, and/or those holding bonds
containing a pledge to raise taxes notwithstanding tax caps, or other
similar legislation, may have stronger claims of priority under theories
advanced in cases such as Flushing and Quirk, compared to issuances
without such language. Whatever arguments are made, however, the
reality is as noted above: Detroit does not have the money, and even
if it can (and must) tax, it cannot raise enough money through
taxation to make a meaningful dent in the City’s first budget
obligations due to the City’s economic plight. In these circumstances,
paying bondholders before pensioners, in the face of the Pensions
Clause, seems unlikely. Perhaps for these and related reasons, Judge
Rhodes has referred bondholders to mediation, most recently in the
days and weeks immediately following his ruling respecting
eligibility.329
IV. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?
So, if the legal landscape is uncertain, and the economic situation
dire, where does that leave us? While there certainly are political
obstacles to honest conversations about debt adjustment, Detroit’s
situation ought to spur conversations around reforms to municipal
funding models and debt. Following are a list of potential reforms
that states and municipalities might consider to avoid some of the
problems now plaguing Detroit.

2011, the Rhode Island State General Assembly enacted a law giving bondholders
the right to place liens on tax revenue,’’ which has the effect of ensuring that
bondholders will receive payment before other creditors following a municipal
bankruptcy. Id.
329. See Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued Mediation on DWSD
Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Dec. 30, 2013); Order to Certain Parties to Appear For Continued Mediation
on UTGO Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2013); Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued
Mediation on LTGO Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2013).
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First, states and their political subdivisions would do well develop
and implement early warning systems containing unambiguous and
non-voluntary consequences for municipalities that fall into financial
distress. Detroit’s problems were known, predictable and visible for
many years prior to the bankruptcy filing. While the State did adopt
an intervention procedure (including the appointment of an
emergency manager),330 one might argue that this was too little, too
late. In the future, states would do well to adopt metrics of fiscal
distress that would identify struggling municipalities earlier to provide
earlier feedback to state and local officials, citizens and public
workers.331
Second, having identified problems earlier, states should develop
(or enhance) systems of intervention. According to the Pew
Charitable Trust, some nineteen states have intervention programs
for distressed municipalities, with regimes using a range of strategies
from technical assistance to receivers, emergency managers and
control boards.332 Some regimes allow restructuring of finances,
including debt, labor contracts, taxes, fees and creditors333 and some
provide technical assistance and advice, while others offer loans and
grants.334
(Interestingly, the Pew Charitable Trust found that
Northeastern states are the most likely to have intervention laws: the
Pew Trust speculated that this may be due to presence of many older
cities dealing with the decline of their manufacturing base.335)
With respect to intervention, I recommend robust systems of
intervention (including oversight, technical, and financial assistance),
particularly with regard to planned municipal bond offerings and
related derivatives transactions. With respect to governance, I have
argued in earlier work that public officials and other stakeholders
(including underwriters and swaps providers) ought to be subject to
fiduciary duties when developing and implementing financing plans
involving municipal securities and related derivatives transactions,

330. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing legal basis
for appointment, and activities of, Detroit’s Emergency Manager).
331. In 2012, New York adopted a fiscal stress monitoring system for local
governments. See Local Government and School Accountability: Fiscal Stress
Monitoring System, N.Y. ST. OFFICE ST. COMPTROLLER, http://osc.state.ny.us/
localgov/fiscalmonitoring/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). According the Pew
Charitable Trusts, North Carolina has the oldest intervention program in the country.
See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 199, at 5.
332. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 199, at 9---10, 20.
333. Id. at 7, 18---20.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 22.
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with particular attention to transactions involving complex
instruments with interest rate risk and/or the possibility of high
termination fees.336 I refer to and incorporate those arguments by
reference here, on the theory that governance reforms are key to
righting local governments’ financial ships. Municipalities in distress
should have alternatives to the kind of improvident, ‘‘kick the can’’
down the road transactions now plaguing Detroit. Underwriters and
derivatives providers should deal with distressed municipalities under
a fiduciary standard when structuring funding and financing plans to
avoid the temptation to sell structures and products that work over
the short, but not the long, term.337 It may well be that existing
regimes are ‘‘good enough’’ to deal with the kind of corruption seen in
Jefferson County, Alabama and Detroit, as evidenced by the criminal
convictions of public officials in those jurisdictions. But, fiscal distress
is not always the result of criminally sanctionable fraud. Sometimes,
it is the result of negligence------of short-sighted, marginally selfinterested decision-making, the effects of which are felt over the long
term.338 A uniform fiduciary standard at the time transactions are
structured ------particularly one involving all of the financial
professionals upon which cities, towns, villages, etc. depend------could
enhance governance and improve financial decision-making across
the board. Improving governance with respect to municipal securities
and related transactions us not a cure-all, but it might help prevent or
slow a city’s descent into insolvency.
With respect to fiscal intervention, early warning systems could call
upon states to intervene with financial assistance (whether in the form
of grants, guarantees, etc.) at an earlier stage, with an eye towards
preventing complete fiscal collapse. Prior to distress, states might
also do well to consider systems by which smaller municipalities can
work with and through the state (through state agencies, public
benefit corporations, or the like) to access public markets for
borrowing. Allowing smaller issuers, or issuers experiencing some
distress, to work with and through the states will give these issuers

336. Chung, supra note 34, at 1520---37.
337. Id. at 1523.
338. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 199, at 35; see also Andrew
Kaylotay, What Makes Muni Swaps So Special? Nothing, Actually, BOND BUYER
(Feb. 4, 2011), http://kalotay.com/sites/default/files/municipal-articles/What%20
Makes%20Muni%20Swaps%20So%20Special_Bond%20Buyer.pdf.
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access to better technical and financial assistance, and may result in
better ‘‘deal terms’’ and thus prevent or mitigate financial distress.339
Obviously, financial intervention and assistance is the most
controversial step in any regime------while states do not want
municipalities to fall into receivership or (where available)
bankruptcy, they also do not want cities to incur debts on the
assumption that the state will provide a bailout. The reality is,
however, that local governments are creatures of the state. They have
obligations because of state (and federal) legal and regulatory
regimes, at least in part, and they depend on state aid in ways large
and small. If states do not like bailouts, either because of concerns
about moral hazard or based on concerns about the consequences of
allowing municipalities to default, then states should get involved
earlier to help municipalities to make better decisions------and, as a last
resort, to backstop those decisions if a municipalities’ fortunes go
awry.
Third, states would do well to consider well-articulated
intervention and reorganization/adjustment mechanisms earlier
rather than later, so that plans and resources are in place before a
crisis erupts. When a municipality falls into financial distress,
stakeholders may hold out for payment, on the assumption that they
will be first in line for the issuer’s limited assets. In the absence of
work-out mechanisms, crises may erupt, linger, and get solved (if at
all) in an ad-hoc fashion.
A more orderly restructuring of
unsustainable debt------through a statutory regime and/or control
board-style mechanisms------can reduce loss and enhance a
municipality’s ability to return to fiscal stability.340 For states that
have not yet implemented intervention or workout mechanisms of
this sort, such reforms would make sense.
These proposals are controversial and difficult to implement, as
they implicate core questions of governance and representative
democracy. And, state intervention in local fiscal crises admittedly

339. See Chung, supra note 34, at 1478 (discussing financing for water and sewer
projects made available through Environmental Facilities Corporation, a New York
Public Benefit corporation).
340. See Spiotto, supra note 323, at 11 (proposing uniform state restructuring
legislation, and suggesting that, ‘‘[t]he first step in developing uniform state
restructuring legislation is to understand the needs of financially distressed
municipalities through an analysis of alternatives. Then consideration should be
given to the possible responses a state may make to a financially distressed
municipality. Finally, a structure for a successful rehabilitation of a municipality may
very well involve an oversight or refinance authority, an idea that is a tried and true
success story (New York City and Philadelphia).’’).
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has been controversial (as is the case in Detroit), and has met with a
mixed record of success, due to concerns about loss of local control.341
For all of these reasons, if distress metrics, interventions and/or work
out mechanisms are to make a difference, they must involve all
stakeholders in solutions, including taxpayers, public workers, retirees
and bondholders. While these stakeholders may be forced to the
table through receivership or bankruptcy, these mechanisms involve
rough justice. Starting a dialogue earlier, under the auspices of state
oversight and in the context of a regime that identifies and seeks to
remediate difficulties early on, might enable solutions, or enhance the
balancing of interests necessary to address fiscal strain.
Apart from such mechanisms, some state and local governments
have reduced benefits for workers who come into the system later.
For example, New York State has done this through by placing
employees into ‘‘tiers’’ with different levels of benefits, based on date
of employment.342 State and local governments also have explored
switching from away from defined benefit plans to a defined
contribution model, at least for workers entering the system: at least
thirteen states have introduced some form of defined contribution
plan, according to the Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College.343 In Michigan, for example, the state closed a defined
benefit plan sponsored by Michigan State Employee retirement
system to new entrants in 1997 and caused employees hired after that
date to be enrolled in 401(k) administered by private financial
services firm.344 Professor Michael Thom reportedly found that
privatization has been a net positive for the state of Michigan during
some fiscal periods (i.e., the 2008---2010), from a fiscal perspective.345

341. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 199, at 23---26.
342. See, e.g., New York State & Local Retirement System: What Tier Are You
In?, N.Y. ST. OFFICE ST. COMPTROLLER, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/retire/members/
find_your_tier.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2014); N.Y. State and Local Employees’
Retirement System: Chapter 9 Your Retirement Benefits, N.Y. ST. WORK-LIFE
SERVS., http://www.worklife.ny.gov/preretirement/selfhelpguide/ch9.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2014).
343. See ALICIA MUNNELL ET AL., CNTR FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., A
ROLE FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 1 (2011), available
at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/slp_16-508.pdf.
344. See About the State Employees’ Retirement System, MICH. DEPT. TECH.
MGMT. & BUDGET OFFICE RETIREMENT SERVICES, http://www.michigan.gov/ors/
0,1607,7-144-6183-109542--,00.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
345. See JEFFREY GUILFOYLE, CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH.,
MICHIGAN’S NEW NORMAL: OUR STATE’S ECONOMIC, REVENUE, AND BUDGET
SITUATION 45 (2011), available at http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s
/2011/NMU_02-17-11.pdf (citing MICHAEL THOM, ASSESSING THE COST OF DEFINED
BENEFIT AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS TO PUBLIC EMPLOYERS (2010)). See
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Finally, state and local governments also might consider
implementing ERISA-style flexibility for benefits not yet accrued.
At the end of the day, however, what is most needed to resolve
local government fiscal distress is political courage------something that
inevitably is in short supply. Public officials must be prepared to have
honest conversations about what cities and towns need, and what they
can afford. And, they must be willing to advance cost-saving
measures, even if particular constituencies might object. Put simply,
they ought to serve with candor and integrity, focused always on the
best interest of the municipality and its citizen taxpayers, having been
entrusted with citizens’ public safety and financial health. For this
reason, I restate and reaffirm my earlier argument that requiring
fidelity to the public good------via a mandatory, non-waivable fiduciary
standard for public officials and stakeholders who market and sell
financial products to municipalities------would help to ensure that those
in a position to bind the municipality make decisions that are in the
municipality’s best interest, over the long term.346 This will not
guarantee success------but it will give municipalities a fighting chance.
In these times, for cities like Detroit, perhaps that is all we can hope
for.

generally Michael Thom, From Pension to 401(k): A Case Study of Public Sector
Retirement in Michigan, in PENSIONS: POLICIES, NEW REFORMS AND CURRENT
CHALLENGES 227 (Thom Reilly ed., 2014).
346. In a forthcoming work examining the fiduciary standard, Sitkoff explains that
a mandatory fiduciary core serves a cautionary and protective function in fiduciary
relationships by clarifying rights and obligations, and thus is reconcilable with an
economic theory of fiduciary law. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of
Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew Gold
& Paul Miller, eds.) (forthcoming 2014).

